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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING * 
AND HEATING, * Priority No. 15 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * No. 20020495-SC 
vs. * Trial Court Case: 
* 940300014CN 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN * 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation, * 
Defendants/Appellants * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§78-2-2(5), 78-2a-4, and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3,4,45-51. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: With respect to the Utah mechanics' lien statutes (specifically §38-1-18 
U.C.A. and the term "successful party" as employed therein), did the court of appeals exceed 
its authority when it failed to apply the law already established by the Utah Supreme Court but 
instead, in the guise of interpreting the term "successful party," created a completely new 
framework and definition which not only ignores the mandatory "shalf'language of §38-1 -18 
U.C.A. but substitutes in place of this Court's prior decisions their "flexible approach" or 
"prevailing party" analysis as set forth in Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale. 782 P.2d 551 
(Utah App. 1989)? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The interpretation of a statute poses a question of law 
which this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's 
conclusions." Zoll and Branch, P.C v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997). The 
Appellants (homeowner and builder) believe the foregoing issue primarily challenges the trial 
court's conclusions of law to which an appellate court would accord no particular deference, but 
review for correctness. "[WJhether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998); Soft 
Solutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young University. 1 P.3d 1095 (Utah 2000). 
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney Fees 
filed November 2,1999, Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17,2000, Record 
2050. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah Code §38-1-18: 
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action. Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; 
Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. May 1, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the amended judgment (on 
remand from the court of appeals) of the trial court, which denied Whipple's (plumbing 
2 
subcontractor's) claim for foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien.1 The trial court entered 
a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00, but declined to award the homeowner 
and builder their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien 
foreclosure action, which fees they had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW: 
After four and one-half days of trial, Judge Noel ordered foreclosure of Whipple's 
mechanics' lien and awarded $23,779.33, in damages (inclusive of $7,500.00 attorney fees 
awarded per §38-1-18 U.C.A.; $3,966.82 interest -from August 1,1993 to March 15,1997; and 
$3,470.90 costs of suit.) (Judgment f 3 dated March 7,1997, recorded in Book XX pages 311-
316. -Addendum 3) 
On appeal (first appeal) by the homeowner and builder, the court of appeals reversed the 
trial court in part and entered an order remanding the matter to the trial court for disposition 
consistent with its opinion. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction. 
977 P.2d 518,527 (Utah App. 1999) cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). After remand, 
the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit 
memoranda as to the issues remanded to the trial court by the court of appeals. The trial court 
held a hearing on November 10, 1999, at which time Judge Noel heard arguments and took 
evidence (by way of affidavit) as to the reasonable attorney fees incurred by the parties. On 
January 20,2000, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues -
Record 2022. After the hearing, the trial court denied Whipple's claim for foreclosure of the 
1
 See Addendum " 1 " - Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14,1993. 
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$30,647.20 mechanics1 lien, and entered a judgment in favor of the homeowner and builder 
against Whipple for $527.00. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of 
foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, the trial court declined to award the homeowner and builder 
their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure 
action, which they had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A. In September 2000, Whipple's 
attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order 
of Foreclosure as directed by the trial court in the Memorandum Decision dated January 20, 
2000. The trial court signed the amended pleadings which were filed with the clerk of the court 
on October 18,2000. On November 17,2000, the homeowner and builder timely filed a Notice 
of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to award them their reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure action filed by Whipple. 
On March 14, 2002, the court of appeals entered its decision upholding the trial court. 
On May 6, 2002, the court of appeals entered an order denying the homeowner and builder's 
Petition for Rehearing (based upon misapprehension of a material fact). Homeowner and builder 
subsequently sought certiorari, which this Court granted. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: For purposes of this appeal, the homeowner and 
builder respectfully submit the following as being relevant for this appeal: 
1. The trial occurred over 4 Vi days -- October 11-12, and November 28, 29, and 30, 
1995, during which time the court took evidence of the work which Whipple claimed to have 
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provided to the three (3) separate properties.2 Whipple sought lien recovery identifying 11 
separate claims:3 
Reference 
1. Sewer laterals 
2. Thomas Guy pool house 
3. Diane Quinn sump pump 
4. Municipal water line re-location 
5. French drains 77 Thaynes 
6. Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. 
7. Pool house miscellaneous 
8. Diane Quinn gas line 
9. 77 Thaynes house plumbing 
10. 77 Thaynes house heating 
11. 77 Thaynes house gas piping 
Total Jobs 
Payments 
Principal Balance Due 
Amount 
$10,200.00 
$ 1,665.92 
$ 1,100.00 
$ 6,660.80 
$ 3,162.05 
$ 780.00 
$ 65.00 
$ 631.00 
$13,358.00 
$12,265.50 
$ 1,015.00 
$50,968.27 
$17,000.00 
$33,968.27 
Property 
Thaynes 
Pool house 
Quinn 
Thaynes 
Thaynes 
Thaynes 
Pool house 
Quinn 
Thaynes 
Thaynes 
Thaynes 
Thaynes 
(Exhibit 12 included as Addendum 2.) 
2
 The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are 
referenced hereinafter for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the 
Tom Guy pool house lien; and (3) the Thaynes Canyon property lien. 
3
 Whipple's claims related to the Thaynes property are summarized as follows: 
Reference 
Laterals (sewer) 
Municipal water line re-location 
French drains 
Backhoe 
Plumbing 
Heating 
Gas piping 
Gross Claim 
Less Payments 
Net Claim 
Amount 
$10,200.00 
$ 6,660.80 
$ 3,162.05 
$ 780.00 
$13,358.00 
$12,265.50 
$ 1,015.00 
$47,641.35 
<$17,000.00> 
$30,64135 
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2. Whipple was a licenced plumbing contractor but an unlicenced HVAC (Heating, 
Ventilation and Air Conditioning) contractor. At the outset of the litigation, homeowner and 
builder filed a Motion to Dismiss the HVAC portion of the mechanics' lien claim which Judge 
Brian granted. However, during the trial Judge Noel allowed Whipple to introduce evidence as 
to the HVAC claim and eventually allowed Whipple to recover for such on an "equitable basis." 
(Judge Brian's Pretrial Ruling of May 8, 1995 (Record 113) and Judge Noel's Trial Minute Entry 
(Record 262)). 
3. A timely appeal was filed which was transferred to the court of appeals. 
4. On March 18,1999, the court of appeals entered an opinion (first appeal) remanding 
this matter to the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion stating: 
1f 31 The Utah mechanics1 lien statute provides "in any action brought to enforce 
any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs 
in the action." Utah Code Ann. §38-1-18(1997). In this case, although the trial 
court initially granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's 
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure, it went on to award Whipple 
the value of the work performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this 
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be erroneous 
in light of our determination that section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from 
recovering for its HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record, it appears 
the HVAC claim was the single most important issue in this case and Aspen, 
having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to 
prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court 
determines Aspen is the prevailing party under section 38-1-18, then Aspen must 
be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney fees incurred in 
pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to the trial court for a 
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent with this opinion and 
the entry of findings necessary to support the revised award. [Emphasis 
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supplied by the Appellants.] (p. 525) A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating 
v. Aspen Const. 977P.2d518, cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
A more complete summary of the underlying facts are set forth fully in A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const.. 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999) cert, denied, 994P.2d 
1271 (Utah 1999). (Addendum 5) Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone 
conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues 
identified by the court of appeals for resolution by the trial court. (Telephone conference with 
Judge Noel held September 13,1999.) 
5. On November 2,1999, the homeowner and builder submitted their Memorandum of 
Law and an Affidavit in Support of Attorneys Fees which detailed the dates the work was 
performed, the hourly rate, the time spent, and described in detail the nature of the services 
performed. Additionally, the affidavit allocated the fees between the required three categories: 
(1) the successful claims for which there may have been entitlement to fees; (2) the unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been successful; and (3) 
the claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney fees. (Defendants' Attorney's 
Affidavit-Record 1975) 
6. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The court 
heard arguments and took evidence from the homeowner and builder's attorney as to the 
reasonable attorney fees incurred by the homeowner and builder. Whipple's attorney argued 
at the hearing that he could not allocate the fees between the requisite three categories, but after 
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the hearing submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney fees. (Record 2062, 
Transcript of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10, 1999; Letter and Affidavit of 
Plaintiffs Attorney filed November 12, 1999 — two days following the hearing; see also 
Defendants' Objection to the late submission filed November 17,1999.) 
7. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to the 
remaining issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of the 
$30,647.20 mechanics1 lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00. 
(Record 2022) The initial appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3) separate lien 
foreclosure matters which were consolidated for trial. The trial court held for Whipple on the 
other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts ($631.00 and $1,666.00 
respectively), found Whipple to be the "successful party" with respect to those liens, determined 
$2,500.00 to be the reasonable attorney fees related to each of those lien foreclosure matters 
($5,000.00 total), and entered orders foreclosing those two parcels of property respectively. 
(Record 2022) (Those judgments of foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by 
Aspen.) 
8. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 
mechanics' lien with respect to the Thaynes Canyon property, the trial court declined to award 
the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending 
against the foreclosure, which they had requested pursuant to §3 8-1 -18 U.C. A. (Record 2022) 
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9. In September 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January 20, 
2000, Memorandum Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and were later 
entered by the clerk on October 18, 2000. (Record 2029) On November 17, 2000, the 
homeowner and builder filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to 
award them their attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure 
proceeding. No cross appeal was filed by Whipple. (Record 2050) 
10. In March of 2002 the court of appeals upheld the trial court and on May 6, 2002, 
denied the homeowner and builder's Petition for Rehearing. (The opinion on the second appeal 
of the court of appeals is attached hereto as addendum 6.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals exceeded its authority when it failed to apply the clear precedent 
established by the Utah Supreme Court. §38-1-18 U.C. A contains a legislative mandate that 
the "successful party" in a lien foreclosure action be awarded their reasonable attorney fees 
to be taxed as cost in the action. Prior to the court of appeals' decision in this case, the legal 
definition of a "successful party" in the context of a mechanics' lien case was simple, 
definite and certain. "A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends 
against a lien action." Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,300-01,452 P.2d 325, 
327-28 (1969). The court of appeals' decision in this case not only ignores this Court's 
9 
decisions but effectively overturns years of precedent and creates a completely new legal 
framework for determining when to award attorney fees in mechanics' lien cases, i.e., a 
"flexible approach." It effectively nullifies the mandatory "shall" wording employed by the 
legislature in §3 8-1 -18 U.C. A. and rewrites the statute to provide that the "prevailing party" 
"may" be entitled to their reasonable attorney fees incurred in defeating a lien claim 
depending upon how the trial courts apply the "flexible approach" standard they are now 
instructed to employ. This is contrary to canons of statutory construction which presumes 
the proper legislative construction had already been made by this Court if the statute is 
amended and the language employed by the legislature does not change. The historical 
certainty surrounding this issue has prevented extended litigation as to whether one was a 
successful mechanics' lien claimant or one successfully defeated the mechanics' lien, as the 
two positions were mutually exclusive. The court of appeals' decision ignores the legal 
principle of stare decisis and removes this certainty which will ultimately create more 
litigation regarding attorney fees. 
10 
ARGUMENT 
I. Legal Analysis: Prior to the court of appeals' decision in this case, the legal 
definition of who was a successful party in a mechanics' lien case was definite and certain. 
"A successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien 
action." Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297,300-01,452 P.2d 325,327-28 (1969). 
A "successful party" was simply that; it was the party who successfully enforced or 
defended against a lien action. ProMax Development Corp. v. Raile. 998 P.2d 254 (Utah 
2000) (Homebuilder's lien foreclosure case was dismissed at early stages of litigation; 
appeal ensued. Utah Supreme Court determined that homeowners who successfully 
defended lien foreclosure action were entitled to attorney fees, including attorney fees 
incurred upon appeal.); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co., 714 
P.2d 289 (Utah 1986) (Trial court ruled in favor of labor and materials provider in lien 
foreclosure action. Purchaser of property appealed, and lien claimant's judgment of 
foreclosure was set aside in ruling by the Utah Supreme Court. Whereas lien claimant was 
originally awarded attorney fees by trial court, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that property 
purchaser was now entitled to attorney fees as the successful party.); Duckett v. Olsen, 699 
P.2d 734 (Utah 1985) (Contractor successfully foreclosed on lien. Trial court awarded 
attorney fees to contractor as the successful party; bank appealed ruling. Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed trial court.); Duggerv.Cox, 564 P.2d 300 (Utah 1977) (Party who improved 
property as per contract, but was not compensated, successfully foreclosed on lien. Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed trial court upon appeal and awarded attorney fees to party who 
11 
improved the property, the successful party.); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) (Attorney fees award of $34,000.00 against lien 
claimants who were unsuccessful in obtaining lien foreclosure sustained on appeal.); 
Palombi v. D & C Builders. 22 Utah 2d 297, 300-01, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969). ("A 
successful party includes one who successfully enforces or defends against a lien action."); 
and Brimwood Homes. Inc. v. Knudsen Builders Supply Co.. 385 P.2d 982 (Utah 1963) 
(Materialman filed lien to protect his interest in compensation from builder. Builder 
responded with suit to void materialman's claim to lien, tendering "receipt and lien release" 
as evidence of the invalidity of materialman's lien. Utah Supreme Court validated 
materialman's lien and awarded him attorney fees as the successful party in the action.) 
Historically, the concept of a successful party (as opposed to a prevailing party 
standard) was one that was mutually exclusive. One was a successful party by either 
enforcing a mechanics' lien (if you were the mechanics' lien claimant), or preventing a 
mechanics' lien from being enforced (if you were the party against whom the mechanics' 
lien claim was being brought). 
By holding that the terms "prevailing party" and "successful party" are synonymous, 
the court of appeals overturns years of precedent of this Court and interjects into the process 
a great deal of uncertainty.4 The court of appeals' new "flexible approach" framework will 
4
 This statement is not merely subjective conjecture by the homeowner and builder's 
attorney. It is also the conclusion reached by the editors at West. See case summaries at 
West Headnotes 7 and 8. (Addendum 6) 
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prove particularly troublesome in cases where there are claims, counterclaims and/or cross-
claims. The trial courts will be forced to weigh each of the party's respective claims to 
determine who, if anyone, is entitled to "prevailing party" status. In some cases this may not 
prove difficult; however, in other cases the application of a prevailing party "flexible 
approach" standard may prove difficult and time consuming. See for example Footnotes 7 -
12 and the problematic analysis of the court of appeals in Mountain States Broad. Co. v. 
Neale. 783 P.2d 551, 555-58 (Utah App. 1989): 
Footnote 7: The determination of a "prevailing party" becomes even more 
complicated in cases involving multiple claims and parties, see Pioneer 
Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co., 152 Ariz. 455, 733 P.2d 652 (Ct. 
App. 1986); the granting of non-monetary relief to one or more parties, see 
Watson Constr. Co. v. AmfacMortgage Corp., 124 Ariz. 570, 606 P.2d 421, 
435-36 (Ct. App. 1979); Food Pantry, Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 
58 Haw. 606, 575 P.2d 869, 879 (1978); and where the ultimate award of 
money damages does not adequately represent the actual success of the parties 
under the peculiar posture of the case. See Owen Jones & Sons, Inc. v. C.R. 
Lewis Co., 497 P.2d 312,313-14 (Alaska 1972). These cases demonstrate the 
need for a flexible and reasoned approach to deciding in particular cases who 
actually is the "prevailing party." 
II. Legislative Presumptions and Prior Judicial Constructions: The court of 
appeals' decision ignores the legislative mandate which states in pertinent part: " . . . the 
successful party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees . . . " In the guise of 
interpreting the terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" as being synonymous, the 
court of appeals effectively rewrites §38-1-18 U.C.A., substituting in place of this Court's 
past interpretations their "flexible approach" legal analysis. This is not only contrary to the 
principle of stare decisis but is in contravention of the judicial canon of statutory 
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construction that "where a legislature amends a portion of a statute but leaves other portions 
unamended, or re-enacts them without change, the legislature is presumed to have been 
satisfied with prior judicial constructions of the unchanged portions of the statute and to have 
adopted them as consistent with its own intent." Rocky Mountain Helicopter, Inc. v. Carter, 
652 P.2d 893, 896 (Utah 1982) citing Christensen and State Insurance Fund v. Industrial 
Commission and Morrison, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. was 
amended in 1961 and 1995. Each time the term "successful party" was retained by the 
legislature. The court of appeals5 decision lacks proper judicial restraint and completely 
disregards not only the legislative mandate but also the precedence of this Court's prior 
decisions and the well-established canon of statutory construction that this Court's prior 
judicial construction of the term "successful party" were already consistent with the 
legislative intent of the statute. 
III. Public Policy: From a public policy position the historical certainty 
surrounding this issue has significantly discouraged extended litigation as to whether one 
was a successful party. It is respectfully submitted that this policy i.e., to stand by precedent 
and not to disturb settled points of law, is precisely what stare decisis is intended to 
accomplish. The court of appeals' decision in this case removes this certainty, which will 
create extensively more (and in many instances unnecessary) litigation regarding attorney 
fees. Attorneys representing parties to a mechanics' lien dispute will now be required to 
creatively posture their clients as the "prevailing party" under the new "flexible" approach 
to try to persuade the trial court they are the prevailing party. This in turn will force the trial 
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courts to hold hearings and make detailed findings with respect to each aspect of the claims 
and counterclaims in order to ascertain which of the parties was the "prevailing party" in 
order to determine who is entitled to "successful party" status. The Utah Supreme Court 
should exercise its power of supervision and reverse the court of appeals. 
IV. Legal Analysis as Applied to the Facts of This Case: There is little dispute that 
the legal and factual issues surrounding the lien foreclosure of the Thaynes Canyon property 
were the primary focus of both parties' efforts expended at trial. The court of appeals 
acknowledged this in [^31 of the opinion in the first appeal. (Addendum 5) Whipple, a 
licensed plumbing contractor, but an unlicenced HVAC contractor, asserted that he could 
legally claim and foreclose a $30,647.20 mechanics lien for both plumbing and HVAC work. 
See Addendum 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien) and Addendum 2 (Whipple's trial exhibit #12 — 
Summary of Whipple's lien claims). Although the HVAC claim was the single most 
important issue in the case, it was not the only issue on which the homeowner and builder 
were successful. In addition to defending against Whipple's HVAC claim, the homeowner 
and builder successfully defended against Whipple's claim for labor and equipment in 
installing french drains ($3,162.05), relocating a municipal water line ($6,660.80), and 
backhoe rental ($780.00.) The homeowner and builder also successfully prevailed on their 
counterclaim that the HVAC system was defective. The trial court granted the homeowner 
and builder a $7,000.00 offset for deficiencies it found in the HVAC system as well as a 
$2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing work. All these issues arose during the trial in 
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addition to the licencing issue the homeowner and builder prevailed upon during the first 
appeal.5 
The trial court erred when it held that these issues were not "inextricably related" to 
the overall defense of Whipple's lien claim. When the trial court entered a monetary 
judgment against Whipple (effectually denying the $30,647.20 lien claim) the homeowner 
and builder attained "successful party" status as a matter of law; the trial court's refusal to 
grant them their reasonable attorneys fees related to defeating Whipple' s lien claim was error 
as a matter of law. The trial court's award of attorney fees to Whipple on the two 
mechanics' lien cases in which it succeeded to obtain lien foreclosure, and denial to the 
homeowner and builder on the mechanics' lien claim they successfully defended, is not only 
logically but legally inconsistent and mandates reversal and remand to another trial judge for 
5
 At trial Whipple vigorously pursued its $30,647.20 lien claim. Whipple's trial 
exhibit #12 (Addendum 2) plainly shows that Whipple sought (after the application of the 
$17.000payments made by Aspen) approximately $30,641.35 plus the costs of filing the 
Notice of Claim of Lien, interest and attorney fees. Whipple's lien claim against the 
Thaynes Canyon property was composed of the following items and amounts: 
Item Claimed - 77 Thaynes Canyon Amount 
Laterals (sewer) $ 10,200.00 
Municipal water line re-location $ 6,660.80 
French drains $ 3,162.05 
Backhoe $ 780.00 
Plumbing $13,358.00 
Heating $12,265.50 
Gas piping $ 1,015,00 
Gross Claim $47,641.35 
Less Payments <$17.000.00> 
Net Claim $30.641.35 
(Source: trial exhibit 12 - Addendum 2) 
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a fair and impartial determination of the reasonable attorney fees they incurred in defending 
against Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, including fees and costs related to all 
appeals. 
A. Evidentiary Basis. 
Prior to the hearing, the homeowner and builder's attorney submitted his affidavit 
which was prepared to comply with the requirements articulated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Foote v.Clark, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). Citing the Foote v. Clark decision in f 32 (first 
appeal), the court of appeals stated the following: 
The party must differentiate between the fees and time expended for "(1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an entitlement to 
attorney fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there 
is no entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This requirement also obligates the trial court to 
make findings which closely resemble the requesting party's allocation of fees 
on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly 
identify and document the factors it considered dispositive in calculating the 
award. See id. Absent such an allocation and documentation, this court 
cannot adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. at 57. 
Based upon the foregoing standard, the homeowner and builder's attorney made the 
following allocations of the attorney fees they had incurred through trial and the appeal: 
Category 1: $30,902.89 
Category 2: 4,531.00 
Category 3: 1.000.00 
Total Fees Incurred: $36.433.89 
(See Affidavit of Defendants' counsel paragraphs 5 & 6 filed November 2,1999 - Record 
1975.) 
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The inclusion of the majority of the fees in Category 1 was due exclusively to the fact 
that the defense of Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien claim (comprised of several 
different components — see Addendum 2) required proof of and counter proofs on the 
several claims raised by Whipple: (1) proof by the homeowner and builder as to whether the 
HVAC system was defective and therefore added no value to the property; (2) whether 
Whipple's lack of an HVAC license estopped him from being able to pursue foreclosure as 
a matter of law; and (3) whether Aspen owed Whipple for services it had not contracted or 
requested regarding the installation of french drains, the relocation of the municipal water 
line, and payment for the use of a backhoe left by Whipple at the construction site. 
Generally a mechanics' lien claimant must prove that he has enhanced the value of 
the property; conversely, if the homeowner and builder could prove the HVAC system was 
deficient, then the lien claimant could not have enhanced the property. At trial, the 
homeowner and builder were successful in convincing the trial court that at least $7,000.00 
of repairs were needed to remedy the deficient HVAC installation as well as a $2,000 offset 
for the unfinished plumbing work (See Record 262). By successfully prosecuting the appeal 
on the HVAC issue (which the court of appeals observed was the "single most important 
issue in the case") the homeowner and builder completely defeated the lien claim. 
However, the trial court appears to have lost sight of the fact that the homeowner and 
builder prevailed not only on the HVAC issue but several other disputed issues. 
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B. Trial Court's Analysis. 
The primary issue on remand to the trial court was: In light of the court of appeals' 
disposition of Whipple's HVAC claim, whether the homeowner and builder were now the 
"successful party" in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property, and 
if so what were the reasonable attorney fees they had incurred in defending against the lien 
foreclosure action. 
Following the hearing, the trial court found Whipple to be the successful party with 
respect to the mechanics' lien on the Diane Quinn property as well as the mechanics' lien 
on the Tom Guy pool house property, and awarded $5,000.00 attorney fees to Whipple in 
connection with those two lien foreclosure matters — as to which no appeal or cross appeal 
has been taken. Regarding the lien filed against the Thaynes Canyon property, the trial court 
determined Whipple was not entitled to foreclose the $30,647,20 lien claim, but that 
homeowner and builder were entitled to a monetary judgment against Whipple in the amount 
of $527.00. The homeowner and builder respectfully submit that the denial of the right to 
foreclose the mechanics' lien resulted, as a matter of law, in them being the "successful 
party" as to the foreclosure action filed against the Thaynes Canyon property. 
Notwithstanding, the trial court declined to award the homeowner and builder any attorney 
fees setting forth in the Memorandum Decision two reasons: 1) The homeowner and builder 
had just barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon 
property; and 2) The homeowner and builder "prevailed on an essentially legal issue." 
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A review of the trial court's decision after the trial (Record 262) discloses that with 
respect to the Thaynes Canyon property, the homeowner and builder were successful on the 
following issues: 
$6,660.80 - Relocation of the Park City water line for which Whipple 
sought and was denied recovery of $6,660.80. Compare Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
$3,162.05 - French drains. Whipple sought and was denied recovery 
of $3,162.05 for installation of french drains. Compare Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
$680.00 - Backhoe rental. Whipple sought recovery of $780.00. 
Whipple was only granted relief for $100.00. Compare Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12 with trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
$2,000.00 - Offset for finish work related to plumbing contract. 
Whipple sought $13,358.00, but recovered only $11,358.00. (Record 
262) 
$7,000.00 - Offset for deficiencies in the HVAC system. Whipple 
contended there were no offsets due because there were no 
deficiencies. The trial court granted the homeowner and builder an 
offset of $7,000.00 due to the deficiencies found by the trial court in 
the HVAC system. (Record 262) 
$12,265.00 - HVAC contract. Whipple sought and was denied 
recovery of $12,265.50 for the HVAC system. Compare Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 12 and trial court's original decision (Record 262) with result 
required by application of the court of appeals' decision on the first 
appeal. 
1. 'The Homeowner and Builder Did Not Just Barely Prevail" The first reason 
articulated by the trial court was that the homeowner and builder had just barely prevailed. 
The trial court in explaining its reasoning stated the following: 
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It is important to the Court to note however that defendant [sic] 
is such only by the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where 
Plaintiff was claiming roughly $ 13,000.00 [sic] on the Thayne's 
Canyon property (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid), 
and where Defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for 
the negligence of the plaintiff, and further where the net 
recovery is only $527.00, the Court is of the opinion that this is 
essentially a "draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded. 
The Appellate Courts in our state have acknowledged that the 
"net recovery rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be 
applied strictly under circumstances. 
The trial court's reference to $13,000.00 as the amount of damages which Whipple 
sought is a grossly incorrect statement of Whipple's 11 item lien claim and is totally devoid 
of any support in the record. On the contrary, the record is replete with evidence that 
Whipple was seeking, net of the $ 17,000.00 paid by Aspen, an additional $30,641.35. This 
is perhaps the most frustrating aspect of the appeal. Both the trial court and the court of 
appeals have refused to simply pull out a calculator and perform some basic arithmetic. 
$13,000.00 was not the net amount Whipple was pursuing in the Thaynes lien foreclosure 
action. (See Footnote 4 above and Addendums 1 and 2.) Both lower courts ignored the 
mathematics involved, erroneously seized upon the $13,000.00 figure, and have refused to 
acknowledge the error even when it has been respectfully raised. 
In paragraph 20 (second opinion) the court of appeals recited that Whipple sought 
".. .roughly $13,000.00 (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid..."). This is simply not 
accurate. How the court of appeals became confused on this issue is perplexing, particularly 
in light of the fact that addendums 1 and 2 were attached to the briefs and any attempt to 
perform the simple math involved clearly refutes such. A Petition for Rehearing was filed 
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and trial exhibit #12 (addendum 2) and the mechanics' lien (addendum 1) were again 
referenced in order to clear up any and all question that Whipple was seeking, net of the 
$17,000.00 already paid by Aspen, approximately $30,000.00 - $31,000.00 - not 
$13.000.00. (See Footnote 5 above.) Notwithstanding, the court of appeals failed to correct 
this in its opinion. As an attorney, one is accustomed to helping a client reconcile losing a 
case when the courts make an informed decision based on the facts it finds, but not mistaken, 
misunderstood, or misapprehended facts. Where a court refuses to correct a clear factual 
misapprehension, it appears that the court is selectively utilizing the facts it needs to bolster 
a position that was reached not on the facts or merits of the particular case, but on those facts 
the author needs to logically support the result he or she wishes to reach. It is extremely 
frustrating to the client, but more importantly, reflects very poorly upon the judicial system 
itself, when the parties to a dispute put thousands of dollars of effort into trying to present 
the dispute to a court for a fair resolution. When both the trial court and the court of appeals 
misapprehends a key fact, such as the difference between $13,000.00 ($30,000.00 -
$ 17,000.00) and $30,000.00 ($47,000.00 - $ 17,000.00), and refuse to acknowledge the error, 
let alone correct the error, the public confidence on which the judicial system operates is 
shaken if not entirely lost. 
Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien contained a demand for $30,647.20 plus costs of 
filing. During trial, Whipple vigorously pursued the lien claim which was comprised of the 
following items and amounts: Sewer laterals $10,200.00; Municipal water line relocation 
$6,660.80; French drains $ 3,162.05; Backhoe rental $780.00; Plumbing $13,358.00; 
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Heating $12,265.50; Gas piping $1,015.00; Gross Claim $47,641.35 less payments 
$17,000.00; Net Claim $30,641.35. See Addendums " 1 " and "2." 
But even if for sake of argument Whipple was only seeking $13,000.00, the court of 
appeals' decision is still wrong. It still misapplies the legal standard under which this Court 
has historically determined which party in a lien foreclosure action is the "successful party." 
In essence, the trial court held that defeating a mechanics' lien claim by only a small amount 
is not enough to allow the homeowner and builder to claim successful party status. This is 
error. The homeowner and builder defeated Whipple's mechanics' lien. It is respectfully 
submitted that the trial court incorrectly applied the law. Had the homeowner and builder 
failed to recover any sum but still prevented Whipple from obtaining an order allowing 
foreclosure of the mechanics* lien, they would, pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A., be the 
"successful party" and ergo, entitled to their reasonable attorneys 'fees in obtaining this 
result This is what the legislature intended and what the statute requires. 
An examination of the case law regarding what constitutes a "successful party" 
reveals the application of a simple two-part test: First, the courts look to the complaint in 
the underlying action. If the complaint (or a counterclaim arising out of the underlying 
action) involves the enforcement of a mechanics' lien, then reasonable attorneys' fees shall 
be awarded to the party who was successful. Second, "success" is determined solely by 
whether or not the party asserting the right to enforce the lien was successful. You either are 
or are not successful in obtaining lien foreclosure. The concept is one that is mutually 
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exclusive. Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller. 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); Palombi v. D & C Builders. 
22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969); Rottav.HawL 756 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1988). 
Application of the correct legal standard in this case clearly mandates a conclusion, 
as a matter of law, that the homeowner and builder were the "successful party" as to the 
$30,647.20 lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property. 
2. The Homeowner and Builder Did Not Merely Prevail on a "Legal Issue." 
The trial court went on to explain an additional reason as to why it was denying any 
attorney fees: 
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to 
award no fees. The only reason that the defendant received a 
net recovery, is because it prevailed on an essentially legal 
issue, that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors 
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for 
the installation of the HVAC This issue was clearly distinct 
and separate from the defendants negligence claim. The Court 
does not feel that they are "inextricably tied together" as urged 
by the defendant [sic]. Had the defendant [sic] not prevailed on 
this legal issue concerning the plaintiffs Licensure, then 
plaintiff would have obtained a net recovery of approximately 
$8,646.00. The Court therefore is of the opinion that the 
defendant [sic] should have allocated attorney fees to the 
mechanics lien claim of plaintiff and the time expended 
litigating the Licensure issues but has failed to do so. 
Without attempting to degrade the trial court's reasoning, the homeowner and builder 
respectfully submit that the trial court's reasoning does not give proper effect to the specific 
instructions of the court of appeals (first appeal) and demeans the homeowner and builder's 
status as a successful party because they prevailed merely on a "legal issue" (evidently as 
opposed to an "equitable" or "moral" issue). The trial court's observation that "had the 
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defendant [sic] not prevailed on this legal issue. . ." Whipple would have recovered 
$8,646.00, while mathematically correct, misapplies the legal standard enacted by the 
legislature. On its face, §38-1-18 U.C. A. does not distinguish between the methodology one 
utilizes to attain successful party status. Instead, the legal determination that reasonable 
attorney fees shall be awarded is based solely on whether one is or is not successful in 
relationship with the lien foreclosure claim. The trial court's analysis leads it to the 
incorrect result because it fails to fully analyze the entirety of the $30,647.20 lien claim 
made by Whipple. The trial court appears to have focused instead on just the $13,000.00 
plumbing claim as opposed to the $30,647.20 in claims it asserted in the Notice of Lien 
against the Thaynes Canyon property. 
More importantly, it ignores the fact that it was Whipple's conscious decision to 
pursue the HVAC claim as part of its mechanics' lien even though Whipple lacked the 
proper HVAC license. Whipple's decision to pursue the HVAC claim is what engendered 
the significant attorney fees in this case. As noted by the court of appeals in the first opinion 
(addendum 5) at the outset of the proceedings, Judge Pat Brian granted the homeowner and 
builder's motion to dismiss Whipple's lien claim as to the HVAC work because Whipple 
lacked the proper licensure status. (Record 113) However at trial, over counsel's objection, 
Judge Noel allowed Whipple to introduce evidence of the value of the HVAC work and 
Judge Noel ultimately awarded on an "equitable basis" Whipple's HVAC claim. It was only 
after incurring significant attorney fees and costs, not only at trial but also on appeal, that the 
homeowner and builder were able to prevent Whipple from obtaining foreclosure on the 
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Thaynes Canyon lien claims. Whipple consciously decided to pursue the HVAC claim even 
though his lack of licensure caused the homeowner and builder damages which were 
eventually offset against the lien claim. After trial, the homeowner and builder were forced 
to appeal and were vindicated when the court of appeals reversed Judge Noel as to the 
HVAC claim. Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. was enacted specifically as a remedy for this type of 
case. To deny the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees after defeating 
Whipple's lien claim eviscerates §38-1-18 U.C.A. and renders the language "the successful 
party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees" virtually meaningless. At least 
that is the result in this case. 
In this context, one can see the fallacy of the trial court's logic. As a matter of law, 
the homeowner and builder were the "successful party" in the litigation surrounding the 
Thaynes Canyon property, and they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. The issues 
surrounding the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property, including 
Whipple's licensure status, were "inextricably tied together." 
This legal principal was discussed in First General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480 
(Utah App. 1996) and reaffirmed in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, (Utah 
App. 1999). In Brown, the court of appeals stated the following: 
f 19 We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees 
may not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of 
the compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped. For example, in 
First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), a 
subcontractor sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and 
the homeowner counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. See id. at 
483. The subcontractor prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in 
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both the foreclosure of its lien and defense to the homeowner's counterclaim. 
See id. The trial court awarded fees on the foreclosure claim, but refused to 
award fees under the mechanics' lien statute for defense against the 
homeowner's counterclaim. See id. 
T[ 20 On appeal, we reversed, holding that the subcontractor was entitled to 
fees both in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the 
counterclaim because the two were inextricably tied together. See id. at 486. 
In so holding, we recognized that where the proof of a compensable claim and 
otherwise non-compensable claim are closely related and require proof of the 
same facts, a successful party is entitled to recover its fees incurred in proving 
all of the related facts. See id. 
Like the First General Services case, the fees incurred by the homeowner and builder 
were incurred by the homeowner and builder in pursuing its affirmative claims and 
defending against the lien foreclosure claim; and like the situation in First General Services, 
the "successful party" should not be denied the right to recover their reasonable attorney fees 
because the two were inextricably tied together. The homeowner and builder would 
respectfully request that the Supreme Court reverse the trial court and instruct the trial court 
to grant them their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in all appeals. "An appeal 
from a suit brought to enforce a [mechanics'] lien qualifies as part of 'an action' for the 
purposeofsection38-l-18." J.V. Hatch Const.. Inc. v. Kampros. 971 P.2d 8,15(UtahApp. 
1998) citing Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993). 
Note: Richards, supra was cited with approval in Salmon v. Davis County. 916 P.2d 890, 
895 (Utah 1996).6 
6
 See also footnote 7 at page 196 American Rural Cellular. Inc. v. Systems Comm. 
Corp.. 939 P.2d 185 (Utah App. 1997) which states: 
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CONCLUSION 
The appellate courts of this state are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal 
accuracy and uniformity of the laws of this state. Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 
1997). The homeowner and builder respectfully submit that the trial court's decision which 
denied them an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in defeating Whipple's lien 
was clear error. Homeowner and builder were the "successful party" on the mechanics1 lien 
claim made by Whipple against the Thaynes Canyon property, and they are statutorily 
entitled to be awarded their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection therewith. §38-
1-18 U.C.A. The case should be remanded to the trial court with orders to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing as to what fees and costs were incurred below and on all appeals to 
obtain this result with respect to the Thaynes Canyon litigation. Given that this is Judge 
FN7. Although, as Cellcom suggests, there may not technically have been any 
prevailing or successful party in the prior appeal, in determining who is 
entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1-18, we look to which party was 
ultimately successful. See Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, Inc., 660 
So.2d 623,627 (Fla. 1995). This court did not decide the merits of any claims 
in the prior appeal, and thus it could not be determined who was the successful 
party for purposes of the mechanics' lien statute until the trial court made its 
ruling on remand and until this appeal was resolved. 
Moreover, Syscorn was forced to defend in the prior appeal to "enforce" its 
liens, and thus Syscom is entitled to its attorney fees incurred in defending its 
lien claims on appeal. Cf. First Gen. Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 486 
(Utah.Ct.App. 1996) (holding "the successful defense of counterclaims which 
would otherwise defeat the principal lien claim, in whole or in part, must 
necessarily be considered for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the 
mechanics1 lien statute"). 
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Noel's second ruling which the homeowner and builder have had to appeal, they would 
respectfully request the matter be remanded to another judge. 
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was error. It compounded this error when it 
ignored the multiple claims on which the homeowner and builder had been successful, and 
focused solely on the "legal issue" on which it was reversed by the court of appeals. It 
compounded this error when it ruled that the issues involved in defending Whipple's 
$30,647.20 lien claim and the defenses and offsets were not inextricably tied to each other. 
The trial court and court of appeals' reasons for denying the homeowner and builder's 
request for their reasonable attorney fees, because they merely prevailed on a "legal issue," 
or because they only prevailed by $527.00, failed to apply the correct legal standard. 
Throughout the trial and on appeal, the homeowner and builder constantly challenged 
Whipple's ability to assert a lien against the Thaynes Canyon property and did so for several 
reasons. Whipple was not successful in obtaining foreclosure of the mechanics' lien; 
nonetheless, Whipple caused the homeowner and builder to incur substantial fees defending 
against its mechanics' lien for which a remedy under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. is mandated. 
When Whipple failed to obtain an order of foreclosure on its $30,647.20 lien claim, it 
subjected itself to the foregoing legislative provision which the trial court was obligated to 
follow. 
It is immaterial by what amount the homeowner and builder prevailed. The core 
inquiry is simply whether Whipple was successful in pursuing its lien claim. Whipple was 
not successful. Conversely, the homeowner and builder were successful in preventing the 
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foreclosure of Whipple's $30,647.20 lien. As a consequence of Whipple's failure to obtain 
an order allowing foreclosure of the claimed lien, the homeowner and builder, as the 
successful party, are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. §38-1-18 U.C.A. The trial 
court and court of appeals have effectively disregarded the legislature's unequivocal 
mandate in this area, as well as the historical precedent of this Court. This Court should not 
disregard the legislative mandate of §38-1-18 U.C.A. 
The Utah Supreme Court should reverse and remand the case with instructions to 
award the homeowner and builder their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in 
defending the Thaynes Canyon mechanics1 lien claim at trial as well as for all appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this _/# day of December, 2002. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT and ADDENDUM were mailed, postpaid, to the following this /&_ day of 
December, 2002: 
Steven B. Wall 
WALL & WALL 
5200 South Highland Drive, Suite 300 
SaltLakeCity,UT 84LP-—-. 
G:\AWPData\ASPEN\Cert To Sup. Ct\Petitioneis Brief to the Utah Supreme Courtl.wpd 
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REQUESTS iHTEfttlQUHTAlH LIEN SERVICES 
NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN 
"Mechanic's Lien" 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the under-
signed acting as the duly authorized agent of A.K.& R. WHIPPLE 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, "lien claimant". Said agent hereby gives 
notice of the intention of said claimant to hold and claim a 
mechanic's lien and right of claim against bond, by virtue and in 
accordance with the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. seq., and 
14-1-13 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That said 
lien is against the property and improvements thereon owned or 
reputed to be owned by THOMAS D. GUY. Said property is located at 
77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, Summit County, Utah. 
Legal Description: Parcel #TH8-1 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION #8, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder, Coalville City, Utah. 
The lien claimant was employed by and did provide labor and/or 
materials (H.V.A.C.) at the request of ASPEN CONSTRUCTION for the 
benefit and improvement of said real property. That first labor or 
materials were provided on April 27, 1993 and the last said labor 
and/or materials were provided on August 1, 1993. That there is 
due and owing to said claimant the sum of Thirty Thousand Six 
Hundred Forty-seven dollars and Twenty cents ($30,647.20), together 
with interest, costs of $100.00 and attorney fees, if applicable; 
all for which the lien claimant holds and claims this lien. 
INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, 
Agent for the Hew claimant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
On September 9, 1993, personally app3@red before me Anthony L. 
Scarborough, doing business as INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the 
Company that executed the above and foregoing instrument as agent 
for the lien claimant, and that said instrument was signed in 
behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L. Scarborough 
acknowledged to me that said Company executed the same, 
EN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed my seal. 
My Commission Expires: 
August 9, 1997 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KELLY CASSELL 
My Cwrwtekn fopimi Aug. 9,199; I 
STArfcOFUTAH 
iding in 
Utah-
WSiTfr* 
P.O. BOX 526065 
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-6065 
(801) 486-6672 - Fax 466-2155 
September 17, 1993 
CERTIFIED NO. P 301 439 460 
Thomas D. Guy 
P.O. Box 680728 
Park City, UT 84060 
Re: Lien Against: 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, UT 
Lien Claimant: A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing, Salt Lake City, UT 
Contracting Party: Aspen Construction, Salt Lake City, UT 
Gentlemen/Ladies: 
Please be advised, that the attached Mechanic's Lien has been filed 
at the request of the aforesaid "Lien Claimant11 • The Lien is 
intended to secure for the payment of work, equipment or materials 
provided for the improvement of your property and establishes legal 
rights granted to a contractor or supplier, pursuant to Utah State 
Statutes. 
This Mechanic's Lien will be released from the County Records upon 
payment of all monies due to the claimant. If the obligation is 
not paid, they reserve the right to take further action to enforce 
their right of lien or claim against bond. 
However, it is the claimants preference that litigation be avoided. 
We believe that all parties would be best served if you would 
prevail upon the contracting party to promptly satisfy this 
account. Alternatively, you may wish to pay the claimant directly. 
Your acknowledgement and future correspondence should be made 
directly to the claimant. Please contact Kent Whipple of A.K.&R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating at (801) 359-7141, as all matters 
regarding this debt are handled by them. Thank you. 
enclosure 
cc: A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating 
Aspen Construction 
File 
Tab 2 
JOB ORDER 
JOB DESCRIPTION AMOUNTS 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
ID 
Laterals 
Thomas Guy Poolhouse 
Diane Quiim Sump Pump 
Municipal Water Re-location 
French Drains 77 Thaynes 
Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. 
Pool House Miscellaneous 
Diane Quinn Gas Line 
77 Thaynes House Plumbing 
77 Thaynes House Heating 
77 Thaynes House Gas Piping 
$10, 200.00 
$ 1,665.92 
$ 1,100.00 
$ 6,660.80 
$ 3,162.05 
$ 780.00 
$ 65.00 
$ 631.00 
$13,358.00 
$12,265.50 
$ 1,015.00 
TOTAL $50,968.27 
LEINS AMOUNTS 
1) 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
2) Diane Quinn Residence 
3) Thomas Guy Pool House 
$30,647.20 
$ 631.00 
$ 1,695.92 
TOTAL LIENS $32,974.12 
TOTAL JOBS 
LESS PAYMENTS 
PRINCIPLE BALANCE DUE 
$ 7,000.00 
$ 7,000.00 
$ 3,000.00 
$50,968.27 
$33,968.27 
< EXHIBIT 
Tab 3 
STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679 
WALL & WALL, a.p.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. : 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, : 
Plaintiff, : 
VS. ! 
DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN j 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah s 
corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING j 
AND HEATING, : 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
THOMAS D. GUY and CLAIRE B. : 
GUY, husband and wife and : 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, a Utah : 
corporation, : 
: JUDGMENT 
! Civil No. 94-03-00014 CN 
: (District Court) 
: Circuit Court 
: Civil No. 94-0013 CV 
! Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
Circuit Court 
Civil No. 94-0012 CV 
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
Defendants. 
2 
This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial 
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The 
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B. 
Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendants were 
present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court having taken testimony 
and evidence and having heard the parties' arguments and the Court 
having entered its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law and 
having directed that judgment be entered in accordance therewith; 
Now, therefore, by reason of the law and findings aforesaid: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment against 
Defendant Aspen Construction in the sum of $10,943.00 with interest 
thereon from August 1, 1993 until the date hereof at the rate of 
ten (10)% per annum amounting to the sum of $3,966.82 through March 
15, 1997 and for the sum of $3,467.90 as costs of suit including 
filing the Notice of Lien herein and $7,500.00 as and for 
attorney's fees incurred herein to be taxed as costs, for a total 
sum of $25,877.72 together with Plaintiff's costs and additional 
attorney's fees incurred in preparing the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment amounting to the sum of $1,031.25 
together with such costs and fees as may be incurred to satisfy 
said judgment and that said total sum bear interest at the legal 
rate of 7.45% per annum from the date hereof until paid. 
2. That the sum so due and owing to said Plaintiff is for 
work and labor done and performed and for materials furnished upon, 
&WALL(APC) 
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in, and about the construction and impairment of the premises 
hereinafter described; and that said premises and the interest of 
the respective Defendants therein, are junior, inferior and 
subordinate to the lien or liens of the Plaintiff for the amount of 
lien or liens together with costs and attorney's fees as set forth 
herein. 
3. That pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-5 Plaintiff's 
lien has priority over any lien, interest, mortgage or other 
encumbrances which may have been filed or which may have attached 
subsequent to the time when first work began, or first material was 
furnished by Plaintiff and hereinvolved; also over any interest, 
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien holder had no 
notice and which was unrecorded at the time work began, or first 
materials furnished by Plaintiff on the subject land. 
4. That the interest of Defendant Quinn in the property more 
particularly described below in this paragraph, be sold by the 
Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed 
by law, to satisfy the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said 
property together with other expenses and costs adjudged herein to 
be $11,170.88. 
a. All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah, 
situate in Summit County, Utah. 
5. That the interest of Defendants Thomas Guy and Aspen 
Construction, Inc. in the property more particularly described 
below be sold by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in 
the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy the amount of Plaintiff's 
&WALL(APC) 
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lien against said property together with other expenses and costs 
adjudged herein to be $23,779.33. 
a. All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed in 
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville 
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah. 
6. That the interest of Defendants Thomas D. Guy, Claire B. 
Guy and Aspen Construction in the property more particularly 
described in this paragraph be sold by the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy 
the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said property together with 
other expenses and costs adjudged herein to be $12,576.93. 
a. All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER VALLEY, 
according to the official plat thereof as filed in 
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville 
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah. 
7. Judgment for attorney's fees are taxed as costs and shall 
be a joint and several liability to be satisfied in whole from the 
sale of any of the aforementioned parcels of property or a 
combination of any of said parcels of property. However, at such 
time as the total amount of the attorney's fee award ($7,500.00) is 
recovered in the sale of one or more of the above described parcel 
or parcels of land, then the sheriff shall discount the judgment 
for the attorney's fee from any remaining parcel or parcels to be 
sold. 
8. That after the time allowed for redemption has expired, 
as specified in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-15 the Sheriff shall 
execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective 
premises on said sale or sales. 
&WALL(APC) 
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9. That the proceeds of the respective sale or sales shall 
be applied: 
a. To the payment of the sheriff's fees, disbursements, 
and commissions on each respective sale; 
b. To the payment to Plaintiff of the total sum due for 
principal, interest, and costs of suit, together with interest 
thereon at 7.45% per annum from the date of this Judgment, all 
as more fully set forth in Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this 
Judgment. 
10. That if the proceeds of any sale be insufficient to pay 
the amount so found to be due Plaintiff, with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale, the Sheriff shall, in his return on the sale, 
specify separately as to each property the amount of any such 
deficiency, and on filing said return, the clerk of this court 
shall docket a judgment in favor of Plaintiff for said deficiency 
against Defendant Aspen Construction where a deficiency results. 
Said judgment shall be in the amount of such deficiency, and 
Plaintiff shall have execution therefor. 
11. That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, through or 
under them, and all persons having liens subsequent and inferior to 
Plaintiff's liens, and all persons claiming to have acquired any 
estate or interest in said premises subsequent to Plaintiff's lien 
shall be forever barred and foreclosed from all equity of 
redemption in and to said premises, and every part and parcel 
thereof, from and after the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff of 
Summit County, Utah. 
.&WALL(A.P.C) 
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DATED this day of March, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
L&WALL(A.PC) 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid to Joseph M. 
Chambers, Esq., PRESTON & CHAMBERS, 31 Federal Avenue, Logan, Utah 
84321 on this / day of March, 1997, 
Secretary to Steven B. Wall 
STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING ! 
AND HEATING, ! 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN ; 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah : 
corporation, : 
Defendants. 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN : 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah : 
corporation, : 
Defendants. : 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING : 
AND HEATING, j 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
THOMAS D. GUY and CLAIRE B. i 
GUY, husband and wife and : 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, a Utah : 
corporation, : 
! FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
; Civil No. 94-03-0014 CN 
: (District Court) 
: Circuit Court 
: Civil No. 94-0013 CV 
: Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
: Circuit Court 
: Civil No. 94-0012 CV 
: Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
Defendants• 
This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial 
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The 
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B. 
Wall of WALL & WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendant was 
present and represented by its attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of 
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court having taken testimony 
and evidence and having hear the parties1 arguments and the Court 
having entered its two Minute Entries (written ruling) the Court 
now hereby enters its formal Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This case represents three consolidated cases which 
includes two Circuit Court matters which were consolidated with the 
District Court matter for trial. 
2. That Plaintiff A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating 
Incorporated was at all times material to the various causes of 
action enumerated in this case a Utah corporation with its 
principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and 
that at all times material to these causes Plaintiff was licensed 
with the State of Utah as a general plumbing contractor. 
3. That the Defendant Aspen Construction is a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County and was at all times material to these causes licensed with 
the State of Utah as a general building contractor with an 
aggregate bid limit of $500,000.00. 
4. That Defendants Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are 
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individuals and residents of Summit County, State of Utah and fee 
title owners of property situate in Summit County, Utah, identified 
as follows: 
All Of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Guy Poolhouse 
property. 
5. At all times material Defendant Thomas D. Guy was the fee 
title owner of the property identified as follows: 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed 
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder, 
Coalville City, Utah. 
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Thaynes 
Canyon property, situate in Summit County, Utah. 
6. That at all times material Defendant Diane M. Quinn was 
an individual and resident of Summit County, State of Utah, and fee 
title owner of the property identified as follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
This property is hereinafter referred to as the Quinn 
property, situate in Summit County, Utah. 
7. Sometime in the early part of 1993, the Plaintiff, by and 
through its agent Bill Fenstermaker entered into various agreements 
with Defendant Aspen Construction to perform work on the three 
aforementioned properties. Those various contracts consisted of 
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the relocation of a Park City water line for the benefit of the 
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of a gas line at the 
Quinn property; miscellaneous plumbing work at the Guy Poolhouse 
property; installation of a forced air heating system at the 
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of a gas line at the 
Thaynes Canyon property; the installation of the rough, sub-rough 
and finished plumbing at the Thaynes Canyon property; the 
installation of a hose bib at the Guy Poolhouse property; the 
installation of sewer and water laterals from the street to the 
curb at the Thaynes Canyon property and at 79 Thaynes Canyon and 
the installation of the sewer and water lateral from the curb to 
house at the Thaynes Canyon property. Also, Defendant Aspen 
Construction utilized a backhoe for work unrelated to any of the 
aforementioned which had been rented by the Plaintiff and which was 
located at the Thaynes Canyon property. 
8. That prior to the trial of this matter the Court ruled 
Plaintiff could not recover under its contract with Defendant Aspen 
Construction for the heating system installed at the Thaynes Canyon 
property since it was not a licensed HVAC contractor however, 
Plaintiff could recover for this system on an equitable basis and 
be compensated for any benefit conferred upon the property by the 
installation of said system less any deductions to complete the 
installation and to correct any deficiencies in the system. 
9. That pursuant to agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the Quinn property 
in the amount of $631.00. The work was completed by the Plaintiff 
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in a satisfactory manner on August 3, 1993, and Defendant Aspen 
Construction has failed to pay Plaintiff for said work. 
10. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amount of $631.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as 
Entry No. 387098 in Book 751 at Page 364 of the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder, Summit County, Utah, on the Quinn 
property which is situate in Summit County, Utah, and more 
particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
11. That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff performed miscellaneous plumbing work at Guy 
Poolhouse property. The work was completed in a satisfactory 
manner on July 26, 1993 and the value of said work, is $1,666.00 
which Defendant Aspen Construction has failed to pay to the 
Plaintiff. 
12. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amount of $1,666.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as 
Entry NO. 387096 in Book 751 at Page 00362 of the official records 
of the Summit County Recorder on the Guy Poolhouse property which 
is situate in Summit County, Utah, and more particularly described 
as follows: 
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
13. That pursuant to oral agreement with the Plaintiff 
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Defendant Aspen Construction utilized Plaintiff's backhoe for work 
at the Thaynes Canyon property. There was no agreement between 
Defendant Aspen Construction and the Plaintiff which permitted 
Aspen to utilize this piece of equipment. The reasonable value for 
such use is $100.00 which Defendant Aspen Construction has failed 
to pay the Plaintiff. 
14. That pursuant to written and oral agreements with 
Defendant Aspen Construction, Plaintiff installed the rough, sub-
rough, and finish plumbing at the Thaynes Canyon property which 
work was completed satisfactorily up to the time Plaintiff was 
terminated from the job on August 1, 1993. The original contract 
was $13,000.00 plus extras which the parties further contracted for 
in the amount of $1,158.00. The cost to complete the remaining 
work under the contract is $2,000.00. 
15. The heating system installed at the Thaynes Canyon 
property has some deficiencies more particularly leakage and poor 
air flow to one bedroom as well as no duct or ducts to a portion of 
the basement in the area of the wet bar. Defendants have failed to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that it is necessary to 
completely remove the existing system and install a new system. 
More particularly, Defendants have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of evidence that the three furnaces currently 
installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of said 
furnaces is improperly sized notwithstanding the testimony of 
Defendant's expert to the contrary which is vague at best. The 
type and size of the ducting to the furnaces meets the Uniform 
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Mechanical Code requirements and no higher requirements or standard 
were contracted for by the parties. 
Many of the problems which exist with the present system can 
be corrected with further adjustments and fine tuning of the system 
such as completing the installation of the thermostats as designed 
by the Plaintiff and the connection and operation of the zone 
dampers. However, in order to correct these deficiencies it will 
cost Defendant Aspen the sum of $7,000.00. The equitable value of 
the work performed and benefit conferred upon said property by the 
heating system installed by the Plaintiff is $9,173.00. This 
amount represents the total amount of the price contracted for by 
the parties in the amount of $12,265.00 less $3,092.00 to complete 
the unfinished portion of the heating system. 
16. That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the Thaynes Canyon 
property for the sum of $1,015.00. Said work having been completed 
on August 1, 1993. 
17. That pursuant to an oral agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a sewer and water lateral from the 
curb to the house at the Thaynes Canyon property which was 
completed on or about August 1, 1993. This contract was entered 
into separate and apart from any other contracts pertaining to 
installation of any other portion of the sewer and water laterals 
to said property or the contract relating to the rough, sub-rough 
and finished plumbing of said property. The agreement entered into 
by the parties and the reasonable value for said work is $3,200.00 
WALL(APC) 
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for which Plaintiff has not been paid. Defendants did not present 
evidence which controverted the cost of the installation of the 
water and sewer laterals from the street to the curb at either the 
Thaynes Canyon property or the property at 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
in the amount of $7,000.00. 
18. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amount of $30,647.20 was timely filed on September 14, 1993, as 
Entry No. 387097 in Book 751 at Page 363 on the property identified 
as 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive and which is more particularly described 
as follows: 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed 
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder, 
Coalville City, Utah, situate in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
19. That Defendant Aspen Construction has paid to date the 
sum of $17,000.00 which has been credited to the contracts relating 
to the Thaynes Canyon property and after crediting said amount to 
said contracts Defendant Aspen Construction owes the Plaintiff 
$8,646.00 for the contracts relating to the Thaynes Canyon property 
and $1,666.00 for the Guy Poolhouse property and $631.00 to the 
Quinn property for a total of $10,943.00. 
20. The Plaintiff has prevailed with regard to its mechanic's 
lien claims and having complied with the requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated §38-1-7 Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its 
attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18. The 
court finds in consideration of the complexity of the case and the 
total amount involved, Plaintiff should be awarded as part of its 
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recovery the amount of $7,500.00 as attorney's fees as well as its 
costs incurred in prosecuting this action including the filing of 
the liens against the subject properties and sale of said 
properties. This amount is to be incorporated jointly and 
severally as part of Plaintiff's liens on the three subject 
properties identified more particularly herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for the 
installation of the gas line at the property of Defendant Diane 
Quinn in the amount of $631.00. 
2. That the mechanic • s lien filed on the property identified 
as the Diane Quinn property situate in Summit County, Utah, and 
more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in^the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
is a good, sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject 
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of 
$631.00 and that the interests of Defendants Aspen Construction and 
Diane M. Quinn are decreed junior, inferior and subordinate to the 
interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may be foreclosed by 
the sale of said property by the Summit County Sheriff under an 
order of sale to be issued by this Court and that from the proceeds 
of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount of said lien 
together with its attorney's fees in the amount of $7,500.00 which 
is to be taxed as costs as well as the costs related to the 
prosecution of this lawsuit including the filing of said lien, sale 
fALL(APC) 
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of said property and interest which has accrued since the date of 
work completion, to-wit: August 1, 1993. In the event there 
results a deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to 
the amount due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded 
a judgment against Defendant Aspen Construction for any such 
deficiency. 
3. That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for 
various miscellaneous plumbing work performed at the Guy Poolhouse 
property in the amount of $1,666.00. 
4. That the mechanic's lien filed on the Guy Poolhouse 
property which is situate in Salt Lake County, Utah, more 
particularly described as follows: 
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville/ City, 
Utah. 
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject 
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of 
$1,666.00 and that the interest of the Defendants Aspen 
Construction and Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are decreed 
junior, inferior and subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff 
and that said lien may be foreclosed by the sale of said property 
by the Summit County Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by 
this Court and from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to 
recover the amount of said lien together with its attorney's fees 
in the amount of $7,500.00 which are to be taxed as costs as well 
as the costs related to the prosecution of this lawsuit including 
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the filing of said lien, sale of said property and interest which 
has accrued since the date of work completion, to-wit: July 28, 
1993. In the event any deficiency results after applying all 
amounts from said sale to the amount due and owing the Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment against Defendant Aspen 
Construction, for any such deficiency. 
5. Concerning the Thaynes Canyon property, valid and 
enforceable agreements existed for the installation of the water 
and sewer lateral from the curb to the house in the amount of 
$3,200.00; installation of the rough, sub-rough and finished 
plumbing including extras in the amount of $14,158.00 less 
$2,000.00 for offsets to finish said plumbing; the installation of 
a gas line in the amount of $1,015.00; use of a backhoe in the 
amount of $100.00. Also, a valid agreement existed for the 
installation of the sewer and water laterals from the street to the 
curb at the Thaynes Canyon property and 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive in 
the amount of $7,000.00. In addition to the foregoing, a benefit 
has been conferred upon the Thaynes Canyon property by Plaintifffs 
installation of a forced air heating system and after deducting 
$3,092.00 to finish the uncompleted portion of said work and 
crediting $7,000.00 to correct the deficiencies identified in the 
Court's Findings of Fact, Plaintiff is entitled to recover on an 
equitable basis the sum of $2,173.00 for said heating system. 
After crediting the $17,000.00 in payments made by Defendant Aspen 
Construction for the work performed on the Thaynes Canyon property 
the balance due and owing Plaintiff is $8,646.00. 
VALL(A.PC) 
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6. That the mechanic fs lien filed on the property identified 
herein as the Thaynes Canyon property and situate in Summit County, 
Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
All Of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed 
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder, 
Coalville City, Utah. 
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject 
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of 
$8,646.00 and that the interest of the Defendants Aspen 
Construction and Thomas D. Guy are decreed junior, inferior and 
subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may 
be foreclosed by the sale of said property by the Summit County 
Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by this Court and that 
from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount 
of said lien together with its attorney's fees of $7,apo.OO which 
are to be taxed as costs as well as the costs related to the 
prosecution of this action including the filing of said lien, sale 
of said property and interest which has accrued since the date of 
work completion, to-wit: August 1, 1993. Should there be any 
deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount 
due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is awarded a judgment 
against Defendant Aspen Construction for any such deficiency. 
DATED this day of , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
FRANK G. NOEL 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING & : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
HEATING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO.940300014CN 
APPEALS NO: 970580-CA 
Vs. : 
THOMAS D. GUY & ASPEN CONSTRUCTION 
Defendants. : 
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Utah 
Court of Appeals with instructions to determine the prevailing 
party in this case, in light of their ruling, and to determine an 
allocation of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
The Court has received briefs, affidavits, has heard oral 
argniment, and having taken the matter under advisement now rules 
as follows: 
The Court first observes that the attorney's fees in this 
case on both sides seems excessively high. Plaintiff initially 
claimed approximately $30,000.00 in contractual damages, but has 
admitted throughout that defendant would be entitled to a 
$17,000.00 credit for amounts paid 
WHIPPLE VS. ASPEN PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
on the contracts. Defendant on the other hand claims roughly 
$25,000.00 in damages in based on plaintiff's negligence. If the 
claims for all three properties are considered together, then 
after the trial courts findings and the Court of Appeals ruling 
there would be a net recovery to plaintiff of approximately 
$1,770.00. Each attorney has billed in excess of $30,000.00 in 
attorneys fees. While the Court realizes that the issues were 
rather varied and complex in this matter, the Court does not feel 
that the case was so complex as to justify the awarding of 
attorney's fees in that amount to either party. 
Both parties have submitted affidavits which allocate 
attorney's fees to the three different mechanics liens that are 
the subject matter of the lawsuit. That is the Guy pool house 
property, the Diane Quinn property, and the Thayne's canyon 
property. Plaintiff, however, urges the Court to consider all of 
the properties together rather than individually, in which case 
the plaintiff would have a net recovery in this matter of 
$1,770.00. Defendant asks the Court to separate the claims and 
treat them individually, in which case defendant claims a net 
recovery on the Thayne's canyon property and concedes a net 
recovery in favor of plaintiff on the Guy pool house and Quinn 
properties, but argues as to those properties that the claims 
were undisputed. It is clear that the primary dispute in this 
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case arose from the Thayne's canyon property. However, the Court 
points out that while the defendant says the Guy pool house and 
Quinn property claims were not disputed, neither did the 
defendant pay those claims prior to trial, and indeed when 
plaintiff attempted to introduce supplemental evidence regarding 
the filing of the lien and the mailing of the notice of the lien 
to the owners of those properties, the defendant vigorously 
opposed the introduction of that supplemental evidence. 
In any event under all the circumstances, the Court has 
elected to treat the three properties individually. The Court 
does so for the reason that when all is said and done, the Guy 
pool house and Quinn properties were indeed a minor part of this 
case, and they should not be relied upon to support a claim for a 
significant amount of attorneys fees which were largely incurred 
on a separate matter, i.e., the Thayne's canyon property, for 
which the plaintiff did not prevail. 
Plaintiff allocates $11,250.00 in attorneys fees to the pool 
house property and a like amount to the Quinn property. 
Plaintiff clearly prevailed on those claims. Defendant on the 
other hand, allocates only $2,281.00 of its attorneys fees to the 
Quinn property, and $2,250.00 to the pool house property. The 
Court has reviewed the affidavits, is familiar with the 
complexity of the issues involving in those claims, and finds 
WHIPPLE VS. ASPEN PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
that a reasonable amount of attorneys fees for the prosecution of 
those claims would be $2,000.00 as to each claim for a total of 
$4,000.00 on those claims in favor of plaintiff. 
The Court now turns to the Thayne's canyon property. As to 
the contract claims only, the Court at trial awarded plaintiff 
$32,646.00 which included the following: 
1. Water and sewer 
laterals from curb to house $3,200.00 
2. Plumbing ($14,158.00 
less $2,000 for offsets) $12,158.00 
3. Gas line $1,015.00 
4. Backhoe $100.00 
5. Water and sewer 
laterals from the street to the curb $7,000.00 
6. HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less 
$3,092.00 to finish $9,173.00 
TOTAL: $32,646.00 
AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS: - $17,000.00 
Offset for damages based on deficient 
work - $7,000.00 
TOTAL: $8,646.00 
Less contract price per Court of Appeals - $9,173.00 
GRAND TOTAL: ($ 527.00) 
Under a strict application of "Net Recovery Rule" defendant 
would be the prevailing party on the Thayne's canyon property. 
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant is 
such only by the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where 
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plaintiff was claiming roughly $13,000.00 on the Thayne's canyon 
property (allowing for the $17,000.00 already paid), and where 
defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for the negligence 
of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only 
$527.00, the Court is of the opinion that this is essentially a 
"draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded. The Appellate 
Courts in our state have acknowledged that the "net recovery 
rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied 
strictly under all circumstances. 
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to 
award no fees. The only reason that the defendant received a net 
recovery, is because it prevailed on an essentially legal issue, 
that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors 
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for 
the installation of the HVAC. This issue was clearly distinct 
and separate from the defendants negligence claim. The Court 
does not feel that they are "inextricably tied together" as urged 
by the defendant. Had the defendant not prevailed on this legal 
issue concerning the plaintiff's Licensure, then plaintiff would 
have obtained a net recovery of approximately $8,646.00. The 
Court therefore is of the opinion that the defendant should have 
allocated attorney fees to the mechanics lien claim of plaintiff 
and the time expended litigating the Licensure issues but has 
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failed to do so. 
Accordingly, the Court awards no attorneys fees on the 
Thayne's canyon property, and a total of $4,000.00 in favor or 
plaintiff on the Thomas Guy pool house and Diane Quinn 
properties. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this cQfo Day of JANUARY, 2000: 
U Frank G. Noel 
Presiding Judge 
WHIPPLE VS. ASPEN PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage prepaid, to the following, 
t h i s
 ^X5? daY o f JANUARY, 2000: 
Steven B. Wall 
Wall & Wall 
5200 South Highland Drive, #300 
SLC, UT 84117 
Joseph M. Chambers 
31 Federal Avenue 
Logan, UT 84321 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Tab 5 
977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999) Pagel 
*518 977P.2d518 
365 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 1999 UT App 87 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND 
HEATING, Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-appellant, 
v. 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, Thomas D. Guy, 
Claire B. Guy, and Diane 
M. Quinn, Defendants, Appellant, and Cross-
appellees. 
No. 971580-CA. 
March 18, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1999. 
Subcontractor brought actions against general 
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three 
properties on which it had provided heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and 
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third 
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian 
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of 
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees. 
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Wilkins, P.J., held that: (1) subcontractor could not 
recover for HVAC work because it was not licensed 
to perform such work; (2) granting of subcontractor's 
motion to reopen action to take additional evidence 
was not abuse of discretion; (3) general contractor did 
not adequately marshal evidence in support of 
challenged factual findings, precluding consideration 
of those findings on appeal; (4) remand was required 
to determine whether general contractor was 
prevailing party and thus entitled to attorney fees; (5) 
denial of general contractor's motion to dismiss action 
based on subcontractor's noncompliance with 
scheduling order was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error <®^842(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions 
Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) In General. 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's interpretation 
of a statute for correctness, without deference to the 
trial court's conclusions. 
[2] Appeal and Error <®^977(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k976 New Trial or Rehearing 
30k977 In General 
30k977(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
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30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
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30k982(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] New Trial <®^6 
275 — 
2751 Nature and Scope of Remedy 
275k6 Discretion of Court. 
Consideration of a motion to grant a new trial or 
open a judgment for additional evidence is a matter 
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that 
decision will be reversed only if the judge has abused 
that discretion by acting unreasonably. Rules 
Civ.Proc.,Rule59. 
[3] Appeal and Error <@^842(2) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
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30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions 
Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
[See headnote text below] 
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30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
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30kl008.1(5) Clearly Erroneous Findings. 
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's findings 
of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions for 
correctness. 
[4] Appeal and Error <@=^ 842(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether Questions 
Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] Costs <®^208 
102 — 
102IX Taxation 
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing 
Officer. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is 
a question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews 
for correctness. 
[5] Appeal and Error <®^ >969 
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30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k969 Conduct of Trial or Hearing in General. 
[See headnote text below] 
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388III Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
388kl8 Regulation in General. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the 
cases before them, and Court of Appeals will not 
interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of 
discretion. 
[6] Licenses <®^39.43(1) 
238 — 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Subcontractor that was not licensed to perform 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 
work could not recover for such work in actions 
against general contractor to foreclose on mechanics' 
liens; in addition to general statutory bar arising from 
lack of licensure, none of the common-law exceptions 
applied so as to permit recovery under principles of 
equity. U.C.A. 1953, 38-14 et seq., 58-55-604. 
[7] Appeal and Error <®=>854(1) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k854 Reasons for Decision 
30k854(l) In General. 
Court of Appeals has obligation to affirm the trial 
court on any available basis. 
[8] Licenses <®^>39.43(1) 
238 
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238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Common law exceptions to general statutory bar 
against recovery by unlicensed contractors are 
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designed to prevent. U.C.A. 1953, 58-55-604. 
[9] Licenses <®^39.43(1) 
238 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Unlicensed contractors may recover for quantum 
meruit in four instances: where the party for whom 
the work is done possesses skill or expertise in the 
field; where the work performed was supervised by a 
licensed contractor; where the reason for failing to 
obtain licensure is minor and does not undermine 
ability to perform work, or where party for whom 
work is performed has not relied on unlicensed 
contractor's representations that it was licensed and 
contractor has posted a performance bond. U.C.A. 
1953, 58-55-604. 
[10] Trial <®^66 
388 — 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(B) Order of Proof, Rebuttal, and Reopening 
Case 
388k65 Reopening Case for Further Evidence 
388k66 In General. 
Granting of subcontractor's motion to reopen action 
against general contractor in the interests of justice to 
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take additional evidence regarding subcontractor's 
compliance with mechanics' lien foreclosure statute 
was not abuse of discretion; documents sought to be 
introduced were exhibits to subcontractor's complaint 
that was served on general contractor to commence 
action, and thus nothing unexpected was allowed into 
evidence. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
[11] Mechanics' Liens <S^309 
257 — 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k309 Review. 
In contesting trial court's ultimate *518 
conclusions regarding subcontractor's compliance 
with mechanic's lien statute and the value of its 
plumbing work, general contractor was required to 
show either that the conclusions were incorrect given 
the findings or that the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's determinations were clearly erroneous. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
[12] Appeal and Error <@=* 1012.1(4) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
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To challenge the trial court's factual findings, 
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evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
[13] Mechanics' Liens <®^309 
257 — 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k309 Review. 
General contractor did not adequately marshal 
evidence in support of trial court's findings 
concerning subcontractor's compliance with 
mechanics' lien statute and the value of 
subcontractor's plumbing work, and therefore those 
findings would not be disturbed on appeal; general 
contractor's brief disregarded evidence that supported 
challenged findings while reiterating facts favorable to 
its position, and evidence contained in addendum to 
appellate brief was not organized to show its 
relationship to particular findings but was merely a 
catalogue of all testimony in the record. U.C.A. 
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1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
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30kll78 Ordering New Trial, and Directing 
Further Proceedings in Lower Court 
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Remand was required to determine whether general 
contractor was the prevailing party, and thus entitled 
to attorney fees, in action by subcontractor to 
foreclose mechanics' liens, where subcontractor was 
improperly allowed to recover for heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work for 
which it lacked proper licensure, and HVAC claim 
appeared to be single most important issue in case. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq., 38-1-18, 58-55-604. 
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1953, 38-1-1 et seq., 38-1-18. 
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the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which 
there is no entitlement for attorney fees. 
[17] Costs <@^208 
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102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing 
Officer. 
In awarding attorney fees, trial court must make 
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102IX Taxation 
102kl98 Form and Requisites of Application in 
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Party's failure to apportion requested attorney fees, 
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for the trial court to deny fee request. 
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257k284 Dismissal Before Hearing. 
Denial of general contractor's motion to dismiss 
subcontractor's action to foreclose mechanics' liens, 
following subcontractor's failure to comply with 
scheduling order concerning disclosure of witnesses, 
was not abuse of discretion, where subcontractor's 
responses to interrogatories specified the witnesses it 
intended to call, thus giving general contractor the 
information it needed in order to prepare adequately 
for trial. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq. 
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Any error in subcontractor's action to foreclose 
mechanics' liens against general contractor, in 
allowing witness to testify as subcontractor's expert 
regarding cost and adequacy of subcontractor's 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 
work and in limiting scope of testimony by general 
contractor's expert, was harmless, where Court of 
Appeals determined that subcontractor's unlicensed 
status precluded any recovery for HVAC work, and 
general contractor did not contest trial court's finding 
concerning cost of repairing defective HVAC work. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 58-55-604. 
[23] Appeal and Error <®=^ 1026 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
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of Review 
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Steven B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before WILKINS, P.J., and DAVIS and ORME, JJ. 
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OPINION 
WILKINS, Presiding Judge: 
f 1 Appellant Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals 
from a judgment awarding appellee A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating Whipple (Whipple) 
$3,943 for heating, venting, and air conditioning 
(HVAC) work it performed, and allowing Whipple to 
foreclose on three separate mechanics' liens. Aspen 
also appeals the trial court's decision to award 
Whipple $7,500 in attorney fees. We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
f 2 In 1993, Aspen, a general contractor, entered 
into an agreement with Whipple, a licensed plumbing 
contractor, to provide labor and materials for HVAC 
and plumbing work on three separate properties. 
When problems arose with the HVAC work on one of 
the properties, Aspen discharged Whipple and refused 
to remit any further payment until corrections were 
made. Whipple responded by filing mechanics' liens 
on all three properties and commencing three separate 
foreclosure actions that were later consolidated for 
purposes of trial. 
1f 3 Before trial, Aspen filed a motion to dismiss the 
HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim on 
the basis that Whipple lacked proper HVAC licensure 
as required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998). 
The trial court granted Aspen's motion, however, it 
invoked common law principles of equity *521 and 
determined that because Whipple had conferred a 
benefit upon Aspen, Whipple should be awarded the 
value of that benefit. The court further determined 
that there were deficiencies in Whipple's HVAC work 
and therefore, awarded Whipple the value of this 
work, less the cost Aspen would incur in correcting 
the deficiencies. 
If 4 In June 1995, the trial court issued a scheduling 
order which required Whipple to disclose all 
witnesses by August 1, 1995, and respond to all 
discovery requests by August 31, 1995. On 
September 22, 1995, Aspen filed another motion to 
dismiss alleging Whipple had violated the scheduling 
order by failing to disclose witnesses and respond to 
Aspen's discovery requests. The trial court denied 
Aspen's motion, ruling that Aspen was not 
sufficiently prejudiced because Whipple provided 
Aspen with a complete list of witnesses it intended to 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
call at trial. 
If 5 During trial, which took place in early October 
1995, the court heard evidence concerning the value 
of the work Whipple had performed on the various 
properties. Aspen also pursued its counterclaim 
seeking damages for the allegedly defective HVAC 
work. The trial did not conclude as scheduled and 
was continued until November. 
K 6 When the trial resumed in late November, the 
trial court allowed Ken Whipple to testify as an 
HVAC expert witness. Mr. Whipple, although not a 
licensed HVAC contractor during the earlier part of 
the trial, had obtained his HVAC license before the 
trial resumed. In response to Mr. Whipple's 
testimony, Aspen attempted to introduce the 
testimony of its expert regarding defects in the HVAC 
work. However, the trial court restricted the scope of 
this testimony because Aspen failed to list its expert 
as a potential expert witness. 
f 7 At the close of trial, Aspen argued that Whipple 
had failed to meet the threshold requirement of 
establishing valid mechanics' liens. In its minute 
entry dated November 30, 1995, the trial court 
requested that Aspen prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment, and concluded 
that, because neither party clearly prevailed, any 
award of attorney fees would be improper. 
f 8 Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary judgment 
in favor of Whipple along with proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Whipple objected to the 
proposed findings because they did not include an 
order specifying foreclosure of the three liens and 
prepared separate findings which included an order of 
foreclosure. Aspen's counsel objected to Whipple's 
proposed findings, arguing there was insufficient 
evidence to support a foreclosure order. Whipple 
then filed a motion to reopen the case to take 
additional evidence regarding its compliance with the 
mechanics' lien foreclosure statute. The trial court 
granted Whipple's motion "in the interests of justice." 
H 9 On September 19, 1996, the trial court held a 
supplemental hearing and received evidence of the 
mechanics' liens and also took under advisement 
Whipple's request for reconsideration of an award of 
attorney fees. Whipple asserted that now having 
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the 
"prevailing party." Aspen also requested attorney 
fees, arguing it prevailed at the outset on the claim for 
defective HVAC work. On March 31, 1997, the trial 
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court entered formal findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and a judgment awarding Whipple $3,943 for 
its HVAC work. The trial court also denied Aspen's 
fee request, instead awarding Whipple $7,500 in 
attorney fees. In addition, the trial court allowed 
Whipple to foreclose on the three mechanics' liens 
and valued a portion of Whipple's plumbing work for 
sewer laterals at $3,200. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] f 10 Aspen raises several arguments on 
appeal. First, Aspen contends Utah Code Ann. § 
58-55-604 (1998) barred Whipple from maintaining 
this action and that the trial court erred in granting 
Whipple recovery on equitable grounds. This issue 
turns on the trial court's interpretation of a statute, 
which we review for correctness, without deference 
to the trial court's conclusions. See Butterfteld 
Lumber, Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 
1330, 1332 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). Second, Aspen 
argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting 
*522 Whipple's motion to reopen on grounds not 
provided in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. "Consideration of a motion to grant a 
new trial or open a judgment for additional evidence 
under ... [Rule 59] is a matter left to the discretion of 
the trial judge, and that decision will be reversed only 
if the judge has abused that discretion by acting 
unreasonably." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
[3] [4] [5] f 11 Third, Aspen claims there is 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
determination that Whipple adequately complied with 
section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute or its 
valuation of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer 
laterals. "We review the trial court's findings of fact 
for clear error and its legal conclusions for 
correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646 
(Utah 1997). Fourth, Aspen argues the trial court 
erred in denying its request for attorney fees and 
failed to properly allocate Whipple's attorney fee 
award according to its underlying claims. Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law, which we review for correctness. See 
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). Finally, Aspen argues the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss Whipple's 
case for noncompliance with the scheduling order, 
permitting Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC 
expert, and in limiting the testimony of Aspen's 
expert witness. Trial courts have broad discretion in 
managing the cases before them and we will not 
interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of 
discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. 
R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.App.1992). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Licensing Requirements 
[6] H 12 Aspen contends that Whipple's failure to 
comply with the licensing requirements of section 
58-55-604, precludes Whipple from maintaining this 
action and that the trial court erred in allowing 
Whipple to recover on equitable grounds. We agree. 
f 13 Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code provides 
that "[n]o contractor may ... commence or maintain 
any action ... for collection of compensation for 
performing any act for which a license is required ... 
without alleging and proving that he [or she] was a 
properly licensed contractor when the contract sued 
upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of 
action arose." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998). 
Our Legislature has determined that proper licensure 
is of paramount importance and that if a contractor 
performs work without the requisite license, it should 
be denied compensation. Thus, the statute serves the 
dual purpose of protecting the public from 
incompetent contractors, while sanctioning 
contractors who fail to obtain proper licensure. 
K 14 However, this statutory bar is not without 
exception. We have recognized that the statutory bar 
"does not preclude the application of the previous 
common law exceptions to the general rule of non-
recovery. " Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 
801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Thus, a 
court addressing the issue of whether an unlicensed 
contractor may maintain an action for quantum meruit 
must: (1) determine whether the contractor is 
properly licensed or whether its status as an 
unlicensed contractor places it within the purview of 
section 58-55-604; and (2) determine whether the 
contractor is entitled to relief under common law 
principles despite its non-licensure and support that 
conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. In other 
words, if the court concludes the claim falls within 
the purview of section 58-55-604, but the common 
law exceptions apply, then the statutory bar will not 
preclude suit. However, if the court determines 
section 58-55-604 applies but the common law 
exceptions are inapplicable, then section 58-55-604 
absolutely bars the action. 
[7] K 15 Here, the trial court stated "[s]ection 
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58-55-604 U.C.A. is controlling in this case .... [and 
Whipple's] failure to comply with the statute is 
sufficient grounds for the Motion to Dismiss to be 
granted as a matter of law...." The trial court then 
proceeded to allow Whipple to maintain its action 
below and ultimately recover under "principles of 
equity." The court failed to adequately explain 
which common law rules, if any, it applied in this 
case, or support its *523 decision with appropriate 
findings of fact. Nevertheless, because of our 
obligation to affirm the trial court on any available 
basis, see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 
(Utah 1994), we address whether any of the common 
law exceptions allow Whipple to maintain its action. 
[8] [9] If 16 The Utah common law exceptions are 
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper 
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is 
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is 
designed to prevent. See American Rural Cellular v. 
Systems Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035, 1040 
(Utah Ct.App. 1995). Utah courts have generally 
allowed unlicensed contractors to recover for quantum 
meruit in four instances where, notwithstanding the 
contractor's lack of proper licensure, the licensing 
statute's purpose is met. 
U 17 First, unlicensed contractors have been allowed 
to recover when the party for whom the work is to be 
done possesses skill or expertise in the field. See id. 
Here, there is no evidence showing Aspen was 
knowledgeable or skilled in HVAC work. We cannot 
infer from Aspen's general contracting status that it 
possessed special skill or expertise sufficient to 
protect itself from incompetent HVAC work. See 
Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 
766, 768 (Utah 1985) (rejecting unlicensed 
contractor's argument that contracting party's 
reservation of plumbing work for itself rendered it 
knowledgeable in that field). 
f 18 Second, an unlicensed contractor may recover 
if the work it performed was supervised by a licensed 
contractor. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at 
1040. The cases in which this principle has been 
applied have all involved supervision or labor by a 
properly licensed third party thereby protecting the 
original contracting party from the unlicensed 
contractor's incompetence. See Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) (refusing to apply 
statutory bar where unlicensed contractor was 
supervised by licensed contractor and therefore, 
original contracting party "received whatever 
protection is afforded by compliance with the 
licensing statute"); Motivated Management Int'l v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (allowing 
unlicensed contractor to recover where "at least part 
of the construction was performed by a licensed 
contractor" because the licensed party's involvement 
adequately protected original contracting party); 
Fillmore Prods, v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 
P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977) (providing when general 
contractor hired unlicensed subcontractor to provide 
plumbing work, unlicensed subcontractor could 
recover because entire project was supervised by 
licensed project engineer who ensured job was done 
properly). In this case, Aspen did not have the added 
protection of a properly licensed contractor to ensure 
the HVAC work was adequately completed. Instead, 
Whipple performed the work on its own without the 
supervision of someone with proper licensure. Thus, 
we conclude Whipple's HVAC work was not 
adequately supervised to invoke this exception to the 
statutory bar. 
% 19 Third, if the reason a contractor fails to obtain 
proper licensure is minor and does not undermine its 
ability to perform its work, the unlicensed contractor 
may recover. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d 
at 1040; see also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 
P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Utah 1984) (permitting recovery 
where contractor mistakenly, but in good faith, 
believed he could perform work under partner's 
license); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 804-05 
(Utah 1979) (allowing recovery where otherwise 
properly qualified contractor mistakenly allowed 
license to lapse for nonpayment of renewal fee). 
Here, the record shows Whipple has provided HVAC 
work for many years without proper licensure. 
Although Mr. Whipple claims he believed in good 
faith his general plumbing contractors license allowed 
him to install HVAC forced air heating systems, the 
fact is, it did not. Until trial in this case, Whipple 
had never complied with licensing requirements 
showing he possessed the technical competence or 
financial qualifications for licensure. Equally 
important, the trial court heard extensive evidence 
about the inadequacies of Whipple's HVAC work and 
ultimately concluded the HVAC work was deficient. 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Whipple's 
failure to obtain proper HVAC licensure *524 
precludes application of this common law exception. 
H 20 Finally, courts have considered whether the 
contracting party relied on the subcontractor's 
representations that he was properly licensed and 
whether the subcontractor has posted a performance 
bond. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P.2d at 
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1041. Here, Whipple actively solicited and engaged 
in HVAC work for more than sixteen years. As a 
result, Whipple implicitly represented to its customers 
that it was properly licensed and qualified to perform 
such work. In addition, although Whipple claims it 
maintained liability insurance to protect its customers, 
Whipple has offered no evidence of a performance 
bond. Therefore, we conclude Whipple does not fall 
within this final exception to the statutory bar. 
H 21 In sum, we have determined the trial court 
properly applied section 58-55-604 to this case 
because Whipple performed HVAC work without 
proper licensure. We also conclude, however, that 
the trial court erred in allowing Whipple to recover 
for HVAC work under "principles of equity" because 
the common law exceptions to section 58-55-604 are 
inapplicable in this case. We therefore reverse the 
trial court's ruling regarding this issue, and vacate 
any award to Whipple based on the HVAC work. 
2. Motion to Reopen 
[10] 122 Aspen next argues the trial court abused its 
discretion in granting Whipple's motion to reopen "in 
the interests of justice." We disagree. 
K 23 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a 
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional 
testimony after the case has been submitted but prior 
to entry of judgment. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 
496, 497 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, the court has 
directed lower courts to consider such a motion "in 
light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in 
the interest of fairness and substantial justice." Id. 
K 24 Here, the trial judge stated "[I am g]oing to 
grant the motion to reopen and in the interests of 
justice, I think there [are] some glaring 
misunderstandings in the presentation of the evidence; 
and the Court is going to allow the plaintiff to re-open 
as requested in their motion." (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, the mechanics' lien claims in this case were 
actually litigated and the court granted Whipple's 
motion to address the parties' basic disagreement over 
the validity of the liens at issue. Testimony of the 
filing, service, and content of the liens had already 
been received into evidence. The documents sought 
to be introduced by the motion to reopen were 
exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to 
commence the actions. Nothing unexpected was 
allowed into evidence as a result of the motion to 
reopen being granted. The trial court's decision did 
not deprive Aspen of a full and fair consideration of 
the issues regarding the mechanics' liens. Therefore, 
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
3. Compliance with Mechanics' Lien Statute and 
Value of Lateral Work 
[11] % 25 Aspen also argues there is insufficient 
evidence to support two factual determinations by the 
trial court: (1) that Whipple complied with section 
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute; and (2) that the 
value of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals 
was $3,200. In contesting the trial court's ultimate 
conclusions regarding Whipple's compliance with the 
mechanic's lien statute and the value of its plumbing 
work, Aspen must show either that the conclusions 
are incorrect given the findings or that the "factual 
findings underlying ... [the trial court's] 
determination^] are clearly erroneous." Cellcom v. 
Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 189 
(Utah Ct.App. 1997). On appeal, Aspen attacks the 
findings themselves. 
[12] f 26 To challenge the trial court's findings, 
Aspen must "marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidencef,]" thus making them clearly erroneous. Id. 
(citations omitted). We will uphold the trial court's 
findings of fact if the party *525 challenging the 
findings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings. See Allred v. Brown, 893 
P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
[13] Tf 27 Here, Aspen has simply failed to meet this 
burden. It did not marshal all the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings or show that, viewing the 
evidence in a light favorable to the court's rulings, the 
findings were clearly erroneous. Aspen ignores, for 
example, the fact that Whipple offered copies of the 
mechanics' liens into evidence which the court 
accepted into evidence as being authenticated 
documents. Aspen also disregards the extensive 
evidence presented at trial regarding the value of 
Whipple's plumbing work. Rather, Aspen merely 
restates those facts favorable to its position or in the 
alternative argues there was insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's findings. 
If 28 Although Aspen maintains it adequately 
marshaled the evidence in an addendum to its brief, 
the Utah Supreme Court has denounced the practice 
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of marshaling evidence in an appendix stating that 
"[t]his does not comply with the requirement to 
marshal evidence. It is improper for counsel to 
attempt to enlarge the page limit of briefing by 
placing critical facts in appendices." DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 n. 3 (Utah 
1994). Worse yet, the addendum does not include a 
properly focused marshaling of the evidence 
supporting particular findings under attack, but rather 
is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the 
record. Thus, we must assume the evidence 
supported the findings underlying the trial court's 
determination that Whipple complied with section 
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute and that it 
adequately valued Whipple's plumbing work. 
Accordingly, Aspen's argument fails. 
H 29 We note however, that the trial court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 5 includes Whipple's HVAC 
work as part of the order of foreclosure. As 
previously discussed, Whipple is precluded by section 
58-55-604 from recovering for its HVAC work. 
Thus, to the extent Conclusion of Law No. 5 is 
inconsistent with this opinion, it, and any part of the 
judgment that follows therefrom, is vacated. 
4. Attorney Fees 
[14] 1f 30 Aspen next asserts the trial court erred in 
denying its request for attorney fees arguing that 
because it prevailed against Whipple on the HVAC 
portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim, it is the 
prevailing party. In light of our disposition of the 
preceding issues, this contention may have merit. 
f 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case, 
although the trial court initially granted Aspen's 
motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's 
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure, 
it went on to award Whipple the value of the work 
performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this 
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was 
the prevailing party and entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be 
erroneous in light of our determination that section 
58-55-604 precludes Whipple from recovering for its 
HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record, 
it appears the HVAC claim was the single most 
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully 
prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may 
now be entitled to prevailing party status under 
section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court 
determines Aspen is the prevailing party (FN1) under 
section 38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney 
fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore 
remand this issue to the trial court for a 
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent 
with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary 
to support the revised award. 
•526 [15][16][17] f 32 Aspen also asserts the trial 
court erred in failing to properly allot Whipple's 
attorney fees award according to its underlying 
claims. We agree. The Utah Supreme Court has 
required a party seeking attorney fees to allocate its 
request for fees according to its underlying claim. 
See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). 
The party must differentiate between the fees and time 
expended for "(1) successful claims for which there 
may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been 
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This 
requirement also obligates the trial court to make 
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's 
allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d 
at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly identify 
and document the factors it considered dispositive in 
calculating the award. See id. Absent such an 
allocation and documentation, this court cannot 
adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. 
at 57. 
[18] f 33 Here, Whipple submitted an affidavit 
requesting attorney fees. However, the affidavit did 
not differentiate between the work done that was 
subject to a fee award and work that was not. The 
court acknowledged that it "had difficulty, based on [ 
Whipple's] attorney fee affidavit, in separating the 
amount of time involved with the mechanics' liens as 
opposed to the amount of time spent on other 
matters." Although Whipple's failure to apportion 
attorney fees was a sufficient basis for the trial court 
to deny its fee request, see Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), the court 
went on to state that "in consideration of the 
complexity of the case and the total amount involved, 
plaintiff should be awarded ... $7,500 in attorney 
fees...." 
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K 34 Because the trial court failed to properly 
categorize the fee request or detail the factors it 
considered in computing the award, see Foote, 962 
P.2d at 56 (concluding "[w]here the parties' 
evidentiary submissions in support of a request for 
attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's 
evaluation of those fees"), we reverse and remand the 
issue of fees to the trial court for a redetermination of 
the prevailing party, and, based on that determination, 
an award of attorney fees consistent with this opinion. 
5. Scheduling Order and Expert Testimony 
f 35 Finally, Aspen contends the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to dismiss Whipple's case for 
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting 
Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert, and in 
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's 
expert witness. 
A. Scheduling Order 
[19][20][21] K 36 Aspen asserts the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing Whipple to proceed 
with its case despite its failure to comply with the trial 
court's scheduling order. Because the trial judge 
deals directly with the parties and the discovery 
process, he or she has great latitude in determining 
the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the 
court's business. See Utah Dep't of Tramp, v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995). As a result, 
trial courts have broad discretion in determining 
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants 
sanction. See id. The purpose behind a scheduling 
order is to allow the parties to properly prepare for 
trial and to save the parties from unnecessary 
expenses. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1361. 
f 37 Here, the trial court determined that although 
Whipple failed to adequately comply with the 
scheduling order, Aspen was provided with sufficient 
information to prepare for trial. The court noted that 
in Whipple's response to Aspen's interrogatories, 
Whipple had specified the witnesses it was going to 
call at trial and the substance of their testimony. 
Thus, the trial court determined Aspen was not 
prejudiced by Whipple's violation of the scheduling 
order. Because Aspen obtained the information 
necessary to adequately prepare for trial, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to dismiss Whipple's case. 
*527. B. Expert Testimony 
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[22] f 38 Aspen also asserts the trial court abused its 
discretion in allowing Ken Whipple to testify as an 
expert regarding the cost and adequacy of Whipple's 
HVAC work and in limiting the scope of testimony 
provided by Aspen's expert witness. We conclude 
that any errors in this regard were harmless. 
[23] [24] f 39 In order to prove its entitlement to 
relief on appeal, Aspen must show it was prejudiced 
or harmed by the trial court's action. See Astill v. 
Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App.1998). 
Because we have determined section 58-55-604 
precludes Whipple from maintaining an action to 
recover the cost of its HVAC work, the expert 
testimony regarding the valuation of Whipple's 
HVAC work is irrelevant. In other words, the cost 
Whipple incurred in performing the HVAC work is 
no longer an issue. Furthermore, Aspen does not 
contest the court's finding concerning the cost Aspen 
will incur in repairing the defective HVAC work and 
therefore, we assume its accuracy. See Cellcom, 939 
P.2d at 189. Thus, the trial court's rulings regarding 
the admission of expert testimony could not have 
harmed or prejudiced Aspen in any way and 
therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this 
ground. 
CONCLUSION 
f 40 Because Whipple failed to comply with the 
licensure requirements of section 58-55-604 and none 
of the common law exceptions to the statutory bar 
apply, Whipple is precluded from recovering for its 
HVAC work. Further, we have determined the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
Whipple's Rule 59 motion "in the interests of 
justice." Also, because Aspen failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
regarding Whipple's compliance with the mechanics' 
lien statute and the value of Whipple's sewer lateral 
work, we decline to disturb those findings. We also 
remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for 
a redetermination of the prevailing party and a proper 
allocation of attorney fees to that party. Finally, 
Aspen was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions 
in failing to dismiss Whipple's case for 
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting 
Ken Whipple to testify as a HVAC expert, or in 
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's 
expert witness. 
f 41 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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K 42 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge, and 
GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
(FNl.) On remand, the trial court may find helpftil 
the guidance on this issue offered by Mountain 
States Broad, Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555-58 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND 
HEATING, Plaintiff and 
Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas D. GUY; and Aspen Construction, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 20001009-CA. 
March 14, 2002. 
Rehearing Denied May 6, 2002. 
Subcontractor brought actions against general 
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three 
properties on which it had provided heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and 
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third 
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian 
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of 
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees. 
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
977 P.2d 518, Wilkins, P.J., affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the 
District Court, Coalville Department, Frank G. Noel, 
J., entered judgment in favor of contractor and 
declined to award attorneys fees. Contractor 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, J., held that: 
(1) terms "successful party" and "prevailing party" as 
used in statute and case law were synonymous, and 
(2) neither contractor nor subcontractor was the 
successful party in mechanics' lien foreclosure action 
brought by subcontractor. 
Affirmed. 
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OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge. 
1f 1 Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals from the 
final judgment (on remand from the Utah Court of 
Appeals) of the Third District Court denying A.K. & 
R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating's (Whipple) claim 
for foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien 
claim, entering a net judgment against Whipple in the 
amount of $527.00, and declining to award Aspen 
attorney fees. 
BACKGROUND (FN1) 
If 2 The initial appeal and the subsequent remand 
involved three separate lien foreclosure matters that 
were consolidated into one action for trial. (FN2) 
The trial court ruled in favor of Whipple on the other 
two foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts 
($631.00 for the Dianne Quinn lien and $1,666.00 for 
the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien), found Whipple to be 
the "successful party" with respect to those liens, 
determined reasonable attorney fees related to those 
lien foreclosure matters, and entered orders of 
foreclosure respecting those two parcels of property. 
f 3 On March 18, 1999, we remanded this matter to 
the trial court for disposition consistent with our 
opinion stating: 
The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover [a] 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case ... the 
trial court... went on to award Whipple the value of 
the work performed on Aspen's property. Based in 
part on this finding, the trial court concluded that 
Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an 
award of attorney fees. However, this conclusion 
may be erroneous in light of our determination that 
section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from 
recovering *94 for its HVAC work. Based upon 
our review of the record, it appears the HVAC 
claim was the single most important issue in this 
case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on the 
HVAC claim in this appeal, may now be entitled to 
prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If on 
remand the trial court determines Aspen is the 
prevailing party under section 38-1-18, then Aspen 
must be given the opportunity to present evidence 
regarding attorney fees incurred in pursuing its 
claim. We therefore remand this issue to the trial 
court for a redetermination of the attorney fees 
award consistent with this opinion and the entry of 
findings necessary to support the revised award. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
47 P.3d 92, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, (Utah App. 2002) Page 3 
A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen 
Constr., 1999 UT App 87,f 31, 977 P.2d 518 ( 
Whipple I) (footnote omitted). On remand, the trial 
court conferenced with counsel and set deadlines to 
submit memoranda on the issues we identified. 
% 4 A hearing was held on November 10, 1999, at 
which time arguments were heard and evidence 
presented, by way of affidavit, as to the reasonable 
attorney fees incurred by the parties. At the time of 
the hearing, Whipple's attorney argued that he could 
not allocate fees, but after the hearing an affidavit 
supporting Whipple's claim for attorney fees was 
submitted. 
f 5 On January 20, 2000, the trial court again found 
Whipple to be the successful party with respect to the 
mechanics' lien claim on the Diane Quinn property as 
well as the Tom Guy Poolhouse property, and 
awarded fees to Whipple in connection with those two 
lien foreclosure matters. The trial court denied 
Whipple's claim for foreclosure of the $30,647.20 
mechanics' lien claim filed against Aspen for the 
Thayne's Canyon property because Whipple was not 
licensed to perform HVAC work. After calculating 
an offset for the HVAC work against Whipple's total 
recovery, the court entered a net money judgment in 
favor of Aspen and against Whipple in the amount of 
$527.00. The court also ruled that the outcome was 
essentially a "draw" and concluded neither party 
should be awarded its fees because: 1) Aspen had 
barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action 
involving the Thayne's Canyon property; 2) Aspen 
"prevailed on an essentially legal issue;" and 3) 
Aspen "should have allocated attorney fees [between] 
the mechanics^] lien claim of [Whipple] and the time 
expended litigating the Licensure issues but has failed 
to do so." 
TI 6 Aspen appeals the trial court's failure to award it 
attorney fees incurred in successfully defending 
against the lien foreclosure aspect of the proceeding. 
No cross appeal was filed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] f 7 The issue before us is the scope and 
meaning of "successful party" in Utah Code Ann. § 
38-1-18 (1997). "Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable in an action is a question of law [that] we 
review for correctness." Whipple I, 1999 UT App at 
f 11. "Matters of statutory construction are questions 
of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 
1997). 
[3][4] K 8 Courts generally review a trial judge's 
decision on the amount of attorney fees for abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). In most decisions 
dealing with fee awards, "appellate deference is owed 
to the trial judge who actually presided over the 
proceeding and has first-hand familiarity with the 
litigation." Utah Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Adams, 806 
P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
[5][6][7] 1f 9 The Utah mechanics' lien statute 
provides: "in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be 
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the 
action." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). A 
successful party includes, but is not limited to, one 
who successfully enforces or defends against a lien 
action. See Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1079 
(Utah Ct.App. 1996); Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 
Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325, 327-28 (1969). 
*95 Tf 10 Aspen argues that the terms "successful 
party" and "prevailing party," as used in the statute 
and Utah case law do not have the same meaning and 
that success "is determined solely by whether or not 
the party asserting the right to enforce the lien was 
successful." 
f 11 The terms "prevailing party" and "successful 
party" are often used synonymously. See Cobabe v. 
Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 835 n. 1 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989). Black's Law Dictionary defines the 
term "prevailing party" as: "A party in whose favor 
a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of 
damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will 
award attorney\] fees to the prevailing party). Also 
termed successful party." Black's Law Dictionary 
1145 (7th ed.1999). Black's defines a "successful 
party" as follows: "Seeprevailing party." Id. 
Perhaps the most compelling example of synonymous 
usage is our decision in Whipple I, where, referring to 
the "successful party" language of section 38-1-18, 
we consistently substituted the words "prevailing 
party" in our analysis. Whipple I, 1999 UT App at 
pp 31, 40; see also Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079 
(holding a successful party includes one who 
successfully enforces or defends against a lien action); 
J.V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 15 
(Utah Ct.App. 1998) ("[A] lien claimant's prima facie 
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evidence establishing its right to attorney fees is met 
by showing that it is the prevailing party in the 
mechanics^] lien cause of action."). 
U 12 Further, our courts have addressed 
methodologies for determining which party or parties, 
perhaps among multiple parties or claims, occupy 
prevailing party status in various contexts. See, e.g., 
Reeves, 915 P.2d at 1079; Mountain States Broad. 
Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 
Indeed, "[c]ourts have, in extraordinary situations, 
declined to award attorney fees to a prevailing party 
in spite of an enforceable contractual provision." 
Crawford, 780 P.2d at 836 n. 3. Finally, application 
of our "prevailing party" jurisprudence to section 
38-1-18 does not detract from its objective. Under 
the circumstances presented here, we see no reason 
why the terms "successful party" and "prevailing 
party" should not be used synonymously when 
determining entitlement to attorney fees under section 
38-1-18. 
K 13 In so ruling, we do not suggest that whether a 
claim is ultimately determined to be enforceable under 
the provisions of section 38-1-18 is not a factor to be 
considered in determining which party or parties 
prevail or are successful. 
Tf 14 In Mountain States, both parties challenged the 
trial court's award granting both sides their attorney 
fees. This court, upon review, determined that even 
though plaintiff had obtained an offset in its favor, 
defendant was clearly the prevailing party. The court 
then noted that: 
Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for 
purposes of awarding fees and costs is quite simple. 
Plaintiff sues defendant for money damages; if 
plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has 
prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and 
avoids an adverse judgment, defendant has 
prevailed. However, this simple analysis cannot be 
employed here because both plaintiff and defendant 
obtained some monetary relief against the other. 
Our review of the relevant case law convinces us 
that under the provision at issue, there can be only 
one prevailing party even though both plaintiff and 
defendant are awarded money damages on claims 
arising from the same transaction. 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 555-56 (footnotes 
omitted). 
% 15 In Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. 
Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct.App. 1990), this court 
noted that the Mountain States court had rejected a 
"blanket adoption of the 'net judgment' rule except as 
a good starting point in making determinations of 
which party prevailed." Id. at 221. The Occidental 
court also noted that Mountain States recognized " 
'the need for a flexible and reasoned approach to 
deciding in particular cases who actually is the 
prevailing party.' " Occidental, 791 P.2d at 221. 
(citation omitted). 
K 16 The plaintiffs in Occidental claimed a balance 
due of over $600,000.00 resulting from a trustee sale. 
See id. The defendants asserted that the sale was 
valid but stipulated *96 to a $7,300.00 deficiency 
notwithstanding the sale. See id. As a result, 
plaintiffs obtained a judgment of approximately 
$7,300.00 and argued that they should therefore be 
deemed the prevailing party and thus be entitled to 
attorney fees. Defendants argued that they should be 
the prevailing party because they had successfully 
defended against plaintiffs claim for $600,000.00, and 
the court agreed. See id. at 222. Using a "flexible 
and reasoned approach" the court determined that, 
regardless of having prevailed on this issue, obtaining 
a judgment for a small fraction of the amount sought 
was not enough to warrant a recovery of attorney 
fees. Id. 
K 17 In the case at hand, the trial court applied this 
line of reasoning and made its determination based 
upon the following calculations: 
The [c]ourt now turns to the Thayne's canyon 
property. As to the contract claims only, the [cjourt 
at trial awarded plaintiff $32,646.00, which included 
the following: 
1. Water and sewer laterals from curb to house 
$ 3,200.00 
2. Plumbing ($14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for 
offset) $12,158.00 
3. Gas line $ 
1,015.00 
4. Backhoe $ 
100.00 
5. Water and sewer laterals from the street to 
curb $ 7,000.00 
6. HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less 
$3,092.00 to finish $9,173.00 
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TOTAL: 
$32,646.00 
AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS: 
- $17,000.00 
Offset for damages on deficient work 
- $ 7,000.00 
TOTAL: $ 
8,646.00 
Less contract price per Court of Appeals 
-$9,173.00 
GRAND TOTAL: 
($ 527.00) 
Under a strict application of the "Net Recovery 
Rule" 
defendant would be the prevailing party on the 
Thayne's 
canyon property. 
1f 18 The facts and circumstances surrounding a 
determination of prevailing party status vary widely. 
Because of those variances, we believe it entirely 
appropriate, when adequately supported by the facts, 
to conclude, as the trial court did here, that there is 
no prevailing party. 
[8] H 19 This case, like Occidental, dealt with sums 
far in excess of Aspen's recovery of only $527.00. A 
key part of the flexible approach to deciding who 
actually is the prevailing party is common sense. 
This includes looking at the amounts actually sought 
and then balancing them proportionally with what was 
recovered. See Stichting Mayflower v. Newpark Res., 
917 F.2d 1239, 1248 n. 9 (10th Cir.1990) ("[W]e 
think the district court should attempt to weigh the 
relative success of the parties!'] ... claims if it can 
find a reasoned basis for doing so."). 
U 20 Regarding the Thayne's Canyon Property, the 
facts are undisputed. Whipple sought roughly 
$13,000.00 (allowing for the $17,000.00 already 
paid), and Aspen was claiming $25,000.00 in 
damages for negligence by Whipple. The court 
determined that "where the net recovery is only 
$527.00, ... this is essentially a 'draw,' " in effect, 
determining there was no prevailing party. In making 
this determination the court looked to the language in 
Occidental, and noted that "[c]ourts in our state have 
acknowledged that the 'net recovery rule' is 
essentially a starting point and need not be applied 
strictly under all circumstances." 791 P.2d at 221. 
In addition, the trial court weighed the relative 
success of the parties' claims, reasoning: 1) Aspen 
had barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action 
involving the Thayne's Canyon property; 2) Aspen 
"prevailed on an essentially legal issue;" and 3) 
Aspen "should have allocated attorney fees [between] 
the mechanics!'] lien claim of [Whipple] and the time 
expended litigating the Licensure issues but has failed 
to do so." 
CONCLUSION 
f 21 We hold that, for the purpose of obtaining 
entitlement to attorney fees under the provisions of 
section 38-1-18, the term "successful party" therein is 
synonymous with the term "prevailing party." 
Accordingly, the trial court correctly applied 
"prevailing party" analysis to the undisputed facts of 
*97. this case and appropriately determined that there 
was no "prevailing party." Therefore, we affirm the 
trial court's determination that neither party was 
entitled to an award of attorney fees on the Thayne's 
Canyon claim. 
H 22 WE CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
(FN1.) A detailed summary of the underlying facts in 
this case is set forth in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing 
& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999 UT App 87, 977 
V.2&51Z (Whipple I). 
(FN2.) The three lien foreclosure actions, which 
were consolidated for purposes of trial, are 
referenced herein as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; 
(2) the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the 
Thayne's Canyon property lien. 
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A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
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DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, 
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A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
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Circuit Court 
Civil No. 94-0012 CV 
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
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This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial 
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The 
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B. 
Wall of WALL 8c WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendants were 
present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of 
PRESTON Sc CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court after receiving and 
reviewing all evidence and having considered argument of the 
parties the court entered it's Findings of Fact and Judgment 
whereupon Defendant appealed said Findings of Fact and Judgment and 
the Court of Appeals having rendered it's decision on said appeal 
and having remanded the matter back to the trial court to amend 
it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in 
conformity with it's decision, now, therefore, by reason of the law 
with it's opinion and findings aforesaid: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment jointly and 
severally against Defendants Aspen Construction and Diane M. Quinn 
in the sum of $3,465.10 with interest thereon from August 4, 1993 
until the date hereof at the rate of ten (10)% per annum thereafter 
said judgment is to bear interest at the legal rate of 7.45% per 
annum until paid in full together with such other costs and 
additional attorney's fees as may be awarded by the court. 
2. That the Plaintiff have and recover judgment jointly and 
severally against Defendants Aspen Construction, Thomas D. Guy and 
lf,,t Claire B. Guv in the sum of $4,496.10 with interest thereon from 
TORNDSATLAW 
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July 28, 1993, until the date hereof at the rate of ten (10)% per 
annum thereafter said judgment is to bear interest at the legal 
rate of 7.45% until paid in full together with such other costs and 
additional attorney's fees as may be awarded by the court. 
3. That the sums so due and owing to said Plaintiff is for 
work and labor done and performed and for materials furnished upon, 
in, and about the construction and improvement of the premises 
hereinafter described; and that said premises and the interest of 
the respective Defendants therein, are junior, inferior and 
subordinate to the lien or liens of the Plaintiff for the amount of 
lien or liens together with costs and attorney's fees as set forth 
herein. 
4. That pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §38-1-5 Plaintiff's 
liens have priority over any liens, interests, mortgages or other 
encumbrances which may have been filed or which may have attached 
subsequent to the time when first work began, or first material was 
furnished by Plaintiff and hereinvolved; alsc over any interests, 
liens, mortgages cr other encumbrance of which any lien holder had 
no notice and which was unrecorded at the cirrte work began, or first 
materials furnished by Plaintiff on the subject land. 
5. That the interests of Defendant: Aspen Construction and 
Diane Quinn in the property more particularly described below in 
this paragraph, be sold by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of 
Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy the amount of 
Plaintiff's lien against said property together with other expenses 
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and costs adjudged herein to be $3,465.10 plus interest thereon at 
the rate of 10% per annum until the date hereof and thereafter at 
the rate of 7.45% per annum until paid in full. 
a. All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, Utah, 
situate in Summit County, Utah. 
6. That the interest of Defendants Aspen Construction, 
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy in the property more particularly 
described in this paragraph be sold by the Sheriff of Summit 
County, State of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law, to satisfy 
the amount of Plaintiff's lien against said property together with 
other expenses and costs adjudged herein to be $4,49 6.10 plus 
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum until the date hereof 
and thereafter at the rate of 7.45% per annum until paid in full. 
a. All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER VALLEY, 
according to the official plat thereof as filed in 
the Office of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville 
City, Utah, situate in Summit County, Utah. 
7. That after che time allowed for redemption has expired, 
as specified in Utah Code Annotated §38-1-15 the Sheriff shall 
execute a deed to the purchaser or purchasers of the respective 
premises on said sale or sales. 
8. That the proceeds of the respective sale or sales shall 
be applied: 
a. To the payment of the sheriff's fees, disbursements, 
and commissions on each respective sale; 
b. To the oavment to Plaintiff of the total sum due for 
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principal, interest, and costs of suit. 
9. That if the proceeds of any sale be insufficient to pay 
the amount so found to be due Plaintiff, with interest, costs, and 
expenses of sale from any of these Defendants, the Sheriff shall, 
in his return on the sale, specify separately as to each property 
the amount of any such deficiency, and on filing said return, the 
clerk of this court shall docket a judgment in favor of Plaintiff 
for said deficiency against any of these Defendants where a 
deficiency results. Said judgment shall be in the amount of such 
deficiency, and Plaintiff shall have execution therefor. 
10. That Defendants, and all persons claiming by, through or 
under them, and all persons having liens subsequent and inferior to 
Plaintiff's liens, and all persons claiming to have acquired any 
estate or interest in said premises subsequent to Plaintiff's lien 
shall be forever barred and foreclosed from all equity of 
redemption in and tc said premises, and every part and parcel 
thereof, from and after the delivery of the deed of the Sheriff of 
Summit County, Utah. 
11. That Defendant Aspen Construction is awarded judgment 
against Plaintiff A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating in the 
amount o f $527 . 0 0 . / 
i CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN QBIfifNAL fft U— 
DOCUMENT ON FlLB0tlT<ffi3rHtflBi^TRlgt);0URT^av 0 f f V ftV ^ , 2 0 0 0 . 
SUMMIT COUNTY STATE OF UTAH ^ /. 
DATE. ^LUXJUL*^^ B Y ^ H E C 0 U R T : 
DEPUTY COUNTY CLERK FRANK XG..-JNOEL " \ ^ 
Dist r ic t .Cour t Judde 
L&V\AlU<\i*Cl "-•-. 
)RNEYS AT L-VW 
so. 
STEVEN B. WALL, NO. 3679 
WALL & WALL, a.p.c. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Suite 800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-8220 
FILED 
i . • ; " 2cao 
T v a District Court 
<>y :* ;^x. SLTWtft 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
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A.K.St R. WHIPPLE PLUMBINC 
AND HEATING, 
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CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94-03-00014 CN 
(District Court) 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
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vs . 
DIANE M. QUINN and ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
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Civil No. 94-0013 CV 
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
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THOMAS D. GUY and CLAIRE 3. 
GUY, husband and wife and 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
Circuit Court 
Civil No. 94-0012 CV 
Consolidated to 94-03-00014 CN 
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This matter came before the Honorable Frank G. Noel for trial 
on October 11 and 12, 1995, and November 28, 29, and 30, 1995. The 
Plaintiff was present and represented by its attorney, Steven B. 
Wall of WALL Sc WALL, Salt Lake City, Utah. The Defendants were 
present and represented by their attorney, Joseph M. Chambers of 
PRESTON Sc CHAMBERS, Logan, Utah. The Court after receiving and 
reviewing all evidence and having considered argument of the 
parties the court entered it's Findings of Fact and Judgment 
whereupon Defendant appealed said Findings of Fact and Judgment and 
the Court of Appeals having rendered it's decision on said appeal 
and having remanded the matter back to the trial court to amend 
it's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in 
conformity with it's decision, the Court now hereby enters its 
formal Amended Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. This case represents three consolidated cases which 
includes two Circuit Court matters which were consolidated with the 
District Court matter for trial. 
2. That Plaintiff A.K.& R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating 
Incorporated was at all times material to the various causes of 
action enumerated in these consolidated cases a Utah corporation 
with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah and that said Plaintiff is licensed with the State of Utah as 
a general plumbing contractor. 
3. That the Defendant Aspen Construction is a Utah 
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corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County and is licensed with the State of Utah as a general building 
contractor with an aggregate bid limit of $500,000.00. 
4. That Defendants Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy are 
individuals and residents of Summit County, State of Utah and fee 
title owners of the property identified as follows: 
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
Also, Defendant Thomas D. Guy is the fee title owner of the 
property identified as follows: 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed 
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder, 
Coalville City, Utah. 
5. That Defendant Diane M. Quinn is an individual and 
resident of Summit County, State of Utah and fee title owner of the 
orooertv identified as follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
6. Sometime in the early part of 1993, the Plaintiff, by and 
through its agent Bill Fenstermaker entered into several agreements 
with Defendant Aspen Construction to perform work on the three 
properties which are the subject of these consolidated actions. 
Those various contracts consisted of the relocation of a Park City 
water line at 77 Thavnes Canvon; the installation of a gas line at 
U & v \ A l U A P C i -
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the Diane Quinn property; miscellaneous plumbing work at the Thomas 
Guy poolhouse; installation of a forced air heating system at 77 
Thaynes Canyon Drive; the installation of a gas line at 77 Thaynes 
Canyon Drive; the installation of the rough, subrough and finished 
plumbing at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive. The installation of a hose 
bib at the Thomas Guy poolhouse; the installation of the sewer and 
water laterals from the street to the curb at 77 Thaynes Canyon 
Drive and 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive; the installation of the sewer 
and water lateral from the curb to the house at 77 Thaynes Canyon 
Drive. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendant Aspen Construction 
utilized a backhoe which was rented by the Plaintiff and which was 
at the 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive property for work unrelated to any 
of the aforementioned contracts. 
7. That prior to the trial of this matter the Court ruled 
Plaintiff could not recover under its contract with Defendant Aspen 
Construction for the heating system installed at 77 Thaynes Canyon 
Drive since it was not a licensed HVAC contractor however, 
Plaintiff could recover on an equitable basis and Plaintiff should 
be compensated for any benefit conferred on the property by the 
installation of said heating system less any deductions to complete 
the installation and to correct any deficiencies in the system. 
8. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that Plaintiff 
was denied any recovery for the HVAC system installed at 77 Thaynes 
Canyon Property and was not entitled to be compensated based upon 
any benefit it mav have conferred on the property by virtue of the 
EORNEYSATLAVV 
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installation of the HVAC system. 
9. That pursuant to agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at the property of 
Defendant Diane Quinn which is more particularly described 
hereafter, in the amount of $631.00, The work was completed by the 
Plaintiff in a satisfactory manner and Defendant Aspen Construction 
has failed to pay Plaintiff for said work. 
10. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amount of $631.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1993 as 
Entry No. 387098 in Book 751 at Page 364 of the official records of 
the Summit County Recorder on the property owned by Defendant Diane 
Quinn and more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
11. That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff performed miscellaneous plumbing work at 
Lots 52 and 53 at the Oaks at Deer Valley which property is more 
particularly described hereafter and which is owned by Defendants 
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy. The work was completed in a 
satisfactory manner and the value of said work is $1,666.00 which 
Defendant Aspen Construction has failed to pay to the Plaintiff. 
12. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amounc of $1,666.00 was timely filed on September 14, 1992 as 
Entry No. 387096 in Book 751 at Page 00362 of the official records 
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of the Summit County Recorder on the property owned by Defendants 
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy and more particularly described as 
follows: 
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
13. That pursuant to oral agreement with the Plaintiff 
Defendant Aspen Construction utilized Plaintiff's backhoe for work 
at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive which was not contemplated by any other 
agreements entered into between Defendant Aspen Construction and 
the Plaintiff for work done on the subject property. The 
reasonable value of such work is $100.00 which Defendant Aspen 
Construction has failed to pay the Plaintiff. 
14. That pursuant to written and oral agreements with 
Defendant Aspen Construction Plaintiff installed the rough, 
subrcugh, and finish plumbing at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive which work 
was completed satisfactorily up to a point when Plaintiff was 
terminated from the job. The original contract was $13,000.00 plus 
exiras which the parties contracted for in the amount of $1,158.00. 
The cost to complete the remaining work under the contract is 
$2,OCC.OO. 
15. The heating system installed at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
has some deficiencies more particularly leakage and poor air flow 
to one bedroom as well as no duct or ducts to a portion of the 
basement in the area of the wet bar. Defendants have failed to 
'RN£YbATLAV\ 
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show by a preponderance of evidence that it is necessary to 
completely remove the existing system and install a new system. 
More particularly, Defendants have failed to establish by a 
preponderance of evidence that the three furnaces currently 
installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of said 
furnaces is improperly sized and the testimony of Defendant's 
expert to the contrary is vague at best. The type and size of the 
ducting to the furnaces meets the Uniform Mechanical Code 
requirements and no higher requirements or standard was contracted 
for by the parties. 
Many of the problems which exist with the present system can 
be corrected with further adjustments and fine tuning of the system 
such as complete installation of the thermostats as designed by the 
Plaintiff and connecting and operation of the zone dampers. 
However, in order to correct these deficiencies it will cost 
Defendant Aspen the sum of $7,000.00. 
16. That pursuant to oral agreement with Defendant: Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a gas line at 77 Thaynes Canyon 
Drive for the sum of $1,015.00. 
17. That pursuant to an oral agreement with Defendant Aspen 
Construction Plaintiff installed a sewer and water lateral from the 
curb to the house at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive. This contract was 
entered into separate and apart from any other contracts pertaining 
to installation of any other portion of the sewer and water 
laterals to said property or the contract relating to the rough, 
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subrough and finished plumbing of said property. The agreement 
entered into by the parties and the reasonable value for said work 
is $3,200.00 for which Plaintiff has not been paid. Defendants did 
not present evidence which controverted the cost of the 
installation of the water and sewer laterals from the street to the 
curb at 77 or 79 Thaynes Canyon Drive in the amount of $7,000.00. 
18. That a lien to secure payment for materials and labor in 
the amount of $30,647.20 was timely filed on September 14, 1993, as 
Entry No. 387097 in Book 751 at Page 363 on the property identified 
as 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive and which is more particularly described 
as follows: 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION, #8 
according to the official plat thereof as filed 
in the Office of the Summit County Recorder, 
Coalville City, Utah. 
19. That Defendant Aspen Construction has paid to date the 
sum of $17,000.00 towards the aforementioned amounts and after 
crediting said payments to the total contracts identified herein 
and after deducting the cost for the KVAC system Plaintiff owes 
Defendant Aspen Construction the amount of $527.00. 
20. That neither party has clearly prevailed with respect to 
their various claims related to 77 Thaynes Canyon Property 
therefore, neither party is awarded their attorney's fees or costs 
as to this action. However, Plaintiff has clearly prevailed on 
it's claims related to the Diane Quinn Property and Thomas D. and 
Claire 3. Guy Property therefore, the court awards Plaintiff it's 
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attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000.00 for the claim related to 
the Diane Quinn property and $2,000.00 for the claim related to the 
Thomas D. Guy and Claire B. Guy property which amounts -are to be 
taxed as costs plus it's costs incurred and related to these two 
causes. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for the 
installation of the gas line at the property of Defendant Diane 
Quinn in the amount of $631.00. 
2. That the mechanic's lien filed on the property identified 
as the Diane Quinn property and more particularly described as 
follows: 
All of Lot 6, JEREMY RANCH, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the Office 
of the Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject 
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of 
$631.00 plus $2,834.10 in costs and interest thereon at the rate of 
10% per annum from Augusc 4, 1993, to the date of entry of Amended 
Judgment, thereafter interest at the rate of 7.45% per annum until 
paid in full together with any other costs and fees which may be 
awarded by the court and that the interests of Defendants Aspen 
Construction and Diane M. Quinn are decreed junior, inferior and 
subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff and that said lien may 
be foreclosed by the sale of said property by the Summit County 
Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by this Court and that 
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from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to recover the amount 
of* said lien together with the costs related to the sale of said 
property and interest which has accrued since the date of work 
completion, to-wit: August 4, 1993. In the event there results a 
deficiency after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount 
due and owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment 
jointly and severally against Defendants Diane Quinn and Aspen 
Construction for any such deficiency. 
3. That a valid and enforceable agreement existed for 
various miscellaneous plumbing work performed at the Thomas D. Guy 
and Claire B. Guy property identified as Lots 52 and 53 at the Oaks 
at Deer Valley in the amount of $1,666.00. 
4. That the mechanic's lien filed on the property identified 
as the Thomas Guy poolhouse more particularly described as follows: 
All of Lots 52 and 53, THE OAKS AT DEER 
VALLEY, according to the official plat 
thereof as filed in the Office of the 
Summit County Recorder, Coalville City, 
Utah. 
is a good and sufficient first paramount lien upon the subject 
property securing the payment of the obligation in the amount of 
$1,666.00, plus $2,830.10, in coses and interest thereon at the 
rate of 10% per annum from July 28, 1993, to the date of entry of 
the Amended Judgment thereafter at the rate of 7.45% per annum 
until paid in full cogether with any other costs and fees which may 
be awarded by the court and that the interests of the Defendants 
Asoen Construction, Thomas D. Guv and Claire 3. Guv are decreed 
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junior, inferior and subordinate to the interest of the Plaintiff 
and that said lien may be foreclosed by the sale of said property 
by the Summit County Sheriff under an order of sale to be issued by 
this Court and from the proceeds of said sale Plaintiff is to 
recover the amount of said lien together with the costs related to 
the sale of said property. In the event any deficiency results 
after applying all amounts from said sale to the amount due and 
owing the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is to be awarded a judgment jointly 
and severally against Defendants Aspen Construction, Thomas D. Guy 
and Claire B. Guy for any such deficiency. 
5. Valid and enforceable agreements existed for the 
installation of the water and sewer lateral from the curb to the 
house in the amount of $3,200.00; installation of the rough, 
subrough and finished plumbing including extras in the amount of 
$14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for offsets to finish said plumbing; the 
installation of a gas line in the amount of $1,015.00; use of a 
backhoe in the amount of $100.0C at 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive. Also, 
a valid agreement existed for the installation of the sewer and 
water laterals from the street to the curb at Lots 77 and 79 
Thaynes Canyon Drive in the amount of $7,000.00 which Defendants 
did not contest at the time of trial. Defendant Aspen Construction 
is entitled to an offset of such amounts due* Plaintiff for the 
aforementioned work in the amount of $7,000.00 to correct the 
deficiencies in the HVAC system as more fully identified in the 
Findings of Fact and $17,000.00 in oavments made by Defendant Aspen 
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Construction for work performed at the 77 Thaynes Canyon Property 
thereby resulting in a net amount due Defendant Aspen Construction 
by A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating of $527.00. 
6. Neither party is to be awarded their attorney's fees or 
costs related to the claims of 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive. 
DATED this day of C^ y CA 2000 
BY THE COURT: 
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